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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (4 Nov 69)

FOR OT UT 693266

10 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 3d Battalion,
506th Infantry, Period Ending 31 July 1969 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Kenneth G. Wickham".

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 3d BATTALION (AIRBORNE) 506th INFANTRY
APO San Francisco 96317

AVDG-AF-0

18 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 3d Battalion (Abn), 506th
Infantry for the Period Ending 31 July 1969.

TO: See Distribution

1. Section 1. Operations Significant Activities.

a. Elements of the 3d Battalion (Abn) 506th Infantry were involved in combat, combined, and pacification operations during the reporting period.

b. Task Force 3-506 participated in the following operations during the reporting period:

- (1) Pacification and Fair-Off Operations (Unarmed): 1 May - 31 July 1969
- (2) Small Unit Operations (Unarmed): 1 July - 31 July 1969
- (3) Combined US-ARVN Fair-Off Operations (COBRA Teams): 1 May - 31 July 1969

a. Mission:

- (1) Conduct search and destroy/reconnaissance-in-force operations against VC/NVA forces in Binh Thuan Province.
- (2) Conduct pacification operations in Thien Hoa District.
- (3) Support Revolutionary Development within the assigned AO in conjunction with Binh Thuan Province.
- (4) Conduct combined operations with the 44th ARVN Regiment and RF/FF companies in and around Thien Hoa District.

a. Location: Binh Thuan Province.

c. Reporting Officer: SFC James M. Bower

f. Task Organization: Inclosure # 1

g. After Action Report on Pacification: Inclosure # 2

h. Significant Activities:

- (1) Pacification and Fair-Off Operations continued throughout the reporting period.
- (2) Task Force 3-506 conducted small unit operations in the Binh Thuan Province from 1 May to 31 July 1969.

2. Significant Activities:

a. On 1 May at 1720H vicinity, BMD14276, 3/4/3-506 Infantry and Prov Plat 7-69th were assigned 15 VC at 75 meters. Artillery was employed in support. Reports were friendly-1 KIA; Enemy - 1 VC KIA. On 2 May, at 1500H, vicinity 71062007, the 2/3/3-506 Infantry found a bunker complex consisting of 11 bunkers 5' x 8' x 5' with 3' of overhead cover, 2 hootches, 10' x 12' x 8', 1 table and chair, and an animal cage. An air strike was employed, destroying 4 bunkers and 2 hootches, and damaging 3 other bunkers. On 13 May, COBRA Team 53 found 10 bunkers 3' x 4' x 10', with 2' of overhead cover, while sweeping an area vicinity 41069377. At 1200H 14 May, vicinity 41070265, Recon Team 53 found

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three 105mm rounds and 3 bunkers 10' x 2' x 2' with 2' overhead cover. The 105mm rounds had been badly trapped and were destroyed along with the bunkers, at 1715H, 1/7/3-506 spotted and engaged 5 VC vicinity AM335247. The 3/4/3-506 Infantry was engaged at the northeast area. While conducting a sweep they engaged and killed 1 VC. Countering 822 mortar, they found 5 more VC KIA which has been killed by the 3/4, 1 SRS, 1 rocket launcher, 6 rucksacks, 4 pistol belts, with documents and maps, including medical supplies and some documents. At 1300H, vicinity AM330163, Recon Team 50 spotted 1 VC position leading to the east. Artillery and gunships were employed in support. The gunships received ground fire including several hits. There were no friendly casualties while 1 VC was KIA. On 14 May, at 0730H, vicinity AM331201, 1/1A/3-506 Infantry and 1 squad from the 300th RF Company, made contact with an estimated 15 VC. Artillery and gunships were employed in support. Results were: Friendly - 1 VC KIA; Enemy - 5 VC KIA. The kills were accounted as follows: 2 - 3-506th Infantry, and 3 - 192d Assault Helicopter Company; 1 A1C7 was KIA and 1 B4C rocket launcher was destroyed. At 1215H, vicinity AM334266, 2/4/3-506 Infantry, while on a clearing operation, captured 2 VC, 1 PWS 34 ChiCom SIG, and 7.62 ChiCom pistol, 2 rucksacks, 1 Chinese flag, and a mortar launcher. The VC were extracted to LZ Betty for interrogation. On 15 May, at 0055H, vicinity AM340386, 12 Betty received an estimated fifteen 82mm mortar rounds. Counter mortar and artillery fire was fired in support. Results were: Friendly - 2 KIA and 2 KIA, Enemy - unknown. On 17 May, at 1030H, vicinity AM349154, 0600A Team 51, 3-506 Infantry made contact with an estimated VC company. The VC attacked with 820 rockets, grenades, and automatic weapons. The 0600A Team employed automatic weapons, claymore mines, gunships, and artillery. 0600A Team 31 was extracted to LZ Betty at 2130H. Results were: Friendly - 3 US KIA, 3 VC KIA; Enemy - unknown. On 19 May, at 0615H vicinity AM342166, 1/8/3-506 Infantry found 10 bunkers 3' x 3' x 10' with track on cover, 1 US claymore mine, and 1 ChiCom grenade. All was destroyed. At 1000H, vicinity BK145349, 0600A Team 55 engaged 12 VC with small arms fire. VC returned fire and fled to the north. Results were: Friendly - 4 KIA; Enemy - 2 VC KIA and 2 A1C7's and assorted documents KIA. On 22 May, at 1250H, vicinity AM335285, 1/3/3-506 engaged 15 - 20 VC with small arms fire. Artillery was employed in support. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 6 VC KIA and 1 A1C7 KIA. On 25 May, 2140H, vicinity AM396224, while in night defensive position, 3/4/3-506 engaged 2 VC with small arms and claymore mines. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA and 1 SRS KIA. On 29 May, at 2130H, vicinity AM302167, 1/8/3-506, while in their night defensive position, received small arms fire and B-40 rockets from an estimated 4 VC. Fire was returned with small arms and M79 grenade launchers with the direct mortar firing illumination in support. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA.

5. On 2 June, at 1830H, vicinity AM335223, 2/4/3-506 Infantry, engaged 4 VC with small arms fire. Results were: 3 VC KIA and 1 rucksack, 2 sets IAS, 2 knives and assorted documents KIA. On 3 June, at 0935H, vicinity AM 302167, 1/8/3-506 Infantry, in their night defensive position, received an estimated twelve 82mm mortar rounds. Counter mortar and artillery was fired in support. Results were: Friendly - 2 KIA (US), 1 VC KIA; Enemy - unknown. On 5 June, at 1500H, vicinity AM366453, Recon Team 45, 3-506 Inf, engaged 2 VC with small arms fire. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA and 1 A1C7 KIA. On 6 June, at 0740H, vicinity AM396174, 06/3-506, in their night defensive position, received an estimated five 82mm mortar rounds 82mm rockets, hand grenades and small arms fire. The company returned fire also employing artillery and gunships. Results were: Friendly - 1 US KIA, 1 VC KIA, 2 VC KIA, 7 VC KIA; Enemy - 3 VC KIA, 3 suspects destroyed, and 1 B-40 rocket launcher, 14 ChiCom grenades and 4 B40 rockets KIA. On 6 June at 0630H, vicinity AM399207, 1/8/3-506, in their night defensive position, engaged an estimated VC squad with claymore mines and B-40 fire. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA and assorted documents KIA. On 6 June, at 0605H, vicinity AM335069, 12 Betty received an estimated six to eight 107mm rocket rounds. Counter mortar and artillery fire was employed in support. Results were: Friendly - 3 KIA, 5 KIA and 1 O1E-AF aircraft, 1 building, 1 3/4 ton truck, 1 PWS 47 radio, 1 M28 Radio, 1 M23 Generator and 3 sets binoculars destroyed while 3 buildings were damaged. At 1600H, vicinity AM771-096 234th RF Company, while conducting a sweep of a suspected VC mortar position,

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18 August 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Vietnam (cont) of Sustained (cont), 506th Infantry, for the period ending 31 July 1969.

found 2 VC KIA and 2 AK-47's. On 2 June, at 2100H, vicinity AN851217, 2/A/3-506th Infantry, engaged 1 VC with small arms fire. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA. At 2200H, vicinity AN895177, 1/C/3-506th Infantry, at their night defensive position, engaged 5 VC with claymore mines and hand grenades. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA. At 2325H, vicinity AN895177, 1/C/3-506th Infantry in their night defensive position, received hand grenade and small arms fire from 5 VC. 81mm mortar fired illumination in support. Results were: Friendly - 1 VC KIA; Enemy - unknown. On 9 June, at 0200H, vicinity AN804207, 09/E/5-506th Infantry in their night defensive position, engaged 3 VC with claymore mines. The VC returned fire with small arms and 7 rounds of 81mm mortar. 81mm mortar fire, and illumination were fired in support of US Troops. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA. At 0900H, vicinity AN895177, 1/C/3-506th Infantry, while conducting a sweep of the previous night's contact area, found 1 AK-47, 3 Claymore grenades, 1 B-40 rocket booster, 1 rucksack, and some food and clothing. On 13 June, at 1700H, vicinity AN897178, 2/B/3-506, while in an ambush position, received small arms fire from the 164 RF Co resulting in 1 US KIA, 1 US Interceptor KIA and 1 US Cannon Scout KIA. On 14 June, at 1020H, vicinity AN941453, Recon Team 46, 3-506th Infantry, engaged 3 VC with claymore mines. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 3 VC KIA and 2 AK-47's; 1 M-1 Rifle, 200 rounds AK ammunition, 1 rucksack with cooking utensils, 2 pistol bolts with cartridges and cups and assorted documents CIA. At 2030H, vicinity AN866220, 3/2/A/3-506th Infantry in their night defensive position, made contact with an estimated 15 VC employing small arms, M-79 and 81mm mortar. Results were: 3 US KIA, 3 US KIA; Enemy - 1 VC KIA. On 16 June, at 1130H, vicinity AN932230, 1/D/3-506th Infantry, engaged 4 VC with small arms fire. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA, 1 VC suspect detained, and 1 guitar, cooking utensils, and assorted documents CIA. Also found in the area were 15 bunkers with sleeping positions which were destroyed. At 1625H, vicinity AN932230, a helicopter from the 192nd Assault Helicopter Company received ground fire from an unknown size force. The command and control helicopter, 3-506th Infantry, while checking out the contact area, also received ground fire. Results: 2 US slightly KIA; Enemy - 1 VC KIA. On 18 June, at 0110H, vicinity AN792057, 12 Btry OP received an estimated twenty-two 81mm mortar rounds. Counter mortar anti-aircraft fire was fired in support. Results were: Friendly - 1 3/4 ton truck and 1 water trailer destroyed, and 2 buildings damaged; Enemy - unknown. On 20 June, vicinity AN931132, 1/3/3-506 Infantry found 10 bunkers 4' x 4' x 6', with two feet of overhead cover. The bunkers contained cooking utensils, and assorted ammunition which was destroyed. At 2130H, vicinity AN931137, 1/B/3-506th Infantry in their night defensive positions, engaged 2 VC with claymore mines. Results were: Friendly - negative; Enemy - 2 VC KIA and 1 AK-47 CIA. On 21 June, at 1330H, vicinity AN799177, 3/B/3-506th Infantry found a bunker complex containing 1 rucksack, clothing, cooking utensils, medical supplies, 50 pounds of rice and assorted documents. All but the documents were destroyed. At 1330H, vicinity AN791127, 1/B/3-506 found 6' x 6' bunker containing 2 bangalore torpedoes, 1 GA and 1 WP grenade, cooking utensils, 1 canteen. All was destroyed. On 23 June, at 2245H, vicinity AN791184, 2/B/3-506th Infantry, in their night defensive position, received small arms and M-79 grenade launcher fire from an estimated 4 VC. The unit returned fire with small arms and artillery. Results were: Friendly - 1 KIA; Enemy - unknown. On 30 June, at 0930H, vicinity AN861227, 1/A/3-506th Infantry, received sniper fire. Artillery was employed in support. Results were: Friendly - 1 KIA; Enemy - unknown.

On 2 July, at 0800H, vicinity AN939136, 3/B/3-506 Infantry found 3 graves containing 3 VC killed by small arms fire. The graves were estimated to be 1 month old. At 1130H, vicinity AN893385, 1/C/3-506th Infantry, detonated a booby trapped VC claymore mine. Results: 5 Friendly KIA; Enemy - unknown. On 1 July, at 0930H, vicinity AN899219, 2/A/3-506th Infantry, while on a sweep, activated an unknown type booby trap. Results: Friendly - 3 KIA; Enemy - unknown. On 5 July, at 1510H, vicinity AN895265, 1/D/3-506 found one 105mm mortar tube and breach block. Both were destroyed. On 6 July, at 1855H, vicinity AN934177, 1/B/3-506th Infantry found 1 grave containing 1 VC KIA. The body was estimated to be 10 days old. On 7 July, at 0245H, vicinity AN 930235, 1/B/3-506th Infantry, engaged an estimated VC squad with small arms and M-79 fire. Results were: Friendly - negative; Enemy - 3 VC KIA and 1

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AFM-1-7-69

17 August 1969

CITE: (Classification) (Type of Report) (Reporting Agency) (Reporting Period)

Russian Sniper Rifle with scope, 2 sets of M&S and assorted documents CIA. On 10 July, at 0500H, vicinity AM859182, 1/0/3-506th Infantry, in their night defensive position, received small arms fire, 1 B-40 rocket, and 3 mortar rounds of unknown type. Small arms and 6mm mortar fire was returned. Results were: Friendly - 1 KIA, 3 MIA; Enemy - unknown, 1 H-46 Rifle KIA. On 11 July, at 2100H, vicinity AM859215, 2/2/3-506th Infantry, in their night defensive position, received small arms and automatic weapons fire and 1 B-40 rocket round. Results were: Friendly - 2 VN males KIA, 3 VN female MIA; Enemy - unknown. One medical supply bag with blood on it and 1 VC scarf with emblem CIA. On 13 July, at 1645H, vicinity AM859245, 2/4/3-506th Infantry, engaged 4 VC with small arms fire. 2/1 Cav gunships were employed in support. Results: Friendly - negative; Enemy - 3 VC KIA (2/1 Cav credited for 1 VC KIA) and 1 AK-47, 1 M-2 carbine, one .45 col pistol, 1 B-40 rocket launcher with 2 rounds, 4 Chinese grenades, assorted documents and medical supplies CIA. At 1500H, vicinity AM859228, 1/1/3-506th Infantry activated a miney trapped 175m round resulting in 1 US KIA and 7 US UIA. At 1519H vicinity AM859230, 2/4/3-506th Infantry, activated an unknown type booby trap resulting in 1 US KIA. At 2057H, vicinity AM854187, 2/3/3-506th Infantry, received small arms fire and an estimated 2 B-40 rockets. Small arms and 6mm mortar fire was employed. Results were: Friendly - 2 MIA (slight); Enemy - unknown. On 14 July, at 1605H, vicinity AM859220, 02/1/3-506th Infantry, engaged 3 VC with small arms fire. US artillery was fired in our area. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA and 1 AK-47 and 1 set of L&C CIA. On 17 July, at 0720H, vicinity AM854181, 02/4/3-506th Infantry, while on a sweep operation, found 1 VC killed by mortar fire. On 18 July, at 0735H, vicinity BM045912, COMMA Team 35 sighted and engaged 4 VC with small arms fire. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 2 VC KIA and 1 M-1 Carbine and 4 rucksacks with 7 gallons of water in each CIA. At 0955 H, vicinity BM003265, 1/3/3-506th Infantry, received three 60mm mortar rounds. Results were: Friendly - 1 KIA, 2 MIA; Enemy - Unknown. At 2300H, vicinity AM854190, 1/0/3-506th Infantry, while in their night defensive position, received small arms fire and 4 B-40 rocket rounds from an estimated VC squad. Artillery and gunships were employed in support. Results were: Friendly - 1 RF KIA; Enemy - 1 VC KIA and 1 B-40 rocket, 1 AK-47 negative with ammunition, 4 Chinese grenades and 1 pistol belt CIA. On 21 July, at 1400H, vicinity BM066202, 1/3/3-506th Infantry, found a base camp containing papers, 55-gallon drums, books on tactics, tools, pots, and pans, 7 to 10 chickens, 55 lizards, and approximately 3,000 punji stakes. All but the books and papers were destroyed. At 1625H, vicinity BM066235, COMMA Team 13 sighted 6 VC. 2/1 Cav gunships were employed in support. Results were: Friendly - negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA. On 26 July, at 1400H, vicinity BM044110, 1/4/3-506th Infantry, engaged 2 VC with small arms fire. Results were: Friendly - Negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA, and 1 poncho, 1 US poncho liner, 1 notebook, documents, 1 M-2 Carbine, and 2 magazines CIA. At 1500H, vicinity BM034304, 1/4/3-506th Infantry, engaged 3 VC while in a camp site. The women's log, a search of the camp site revealed 1 dog, 10 pounds of rice, 5 pounds of salt and some cooking utensils. All were destroyed. On 28 July, at 1431H, vicinity BM278563, 2/2/3-506th Infantry, engaged 2 women with small arms fire. A sweep of the area revealed 5 bunkers and a wounded 16-year-old girl, who was unconscious, and Mothered to Lt Betty. Found in the camp were: 4 M&S L&C, 9 sets of clothes, 10 gallons of water, 5 rucksacks, and some muskracks. All was destroyed except the L&C and rucksacks which were returned to Lt Betty. On 29 July, at 1500H, vicinity BM122270, 02/2/3-506th Infantry, engaged 6 VC with small arms fire. Results were: Friendly - negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA and 1 S&S with 100 rounds of ammunition, 10 rounds M-1 ammunition, 1 rucksack, and assorted documents CIA. Overall results for this reporting period were:

- A. FRODOGIBLE (Friendly):
7 KIA/16 MIA (16 Notavac, 30 Minor)
- B. FRODOGIBLE (Enemy):
(1) 62 KIA VC/MVA
(3) 7 POW VC/MVA
(3) 0 Hot Chouan
(b) 123 Detained
- C. EQUIPMENT LOSSES (Friendly):

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12 August 1969

AFSA-11-0

SUBJECT: Operational Report, 21 Battalion (Bn) 500th Infantry, 4th Marine
Brigade, 31 Aug 1969

1. CAPTURED:

- (1) 26 small arms
- (2) 2 B-40 Rocket Launchers
- (3) 13 Back packs
- (4) 3 Bangalore torpedoes
- (5) 1 ton of rice
- (6) 710 small arms rounds
- (7) 7 Grenades

2. DESTROYED:

- 2 - 60mm mortar rounds
- 1 - 105 Howitzer tube and block

3. Intelligence Summary:

a. Enemy Disposition: During the reporting period Military Region 6 Headquarters elements remained in the vicinity of the Binh Thuy, Lon Dong, Binh Thuan borders. The 482 LF Bn remained in its normal operational area in the vicinity of Lo De Mountain (vic 487526) throughout the period. The 840 MF Bn spent most of the period north of Song Mao between Dai Ca Tong (252459) and Lee Tri (284750). The 186 MF Bn was reported to be operating primarily in the Lo Hong Phung (vic 261050) and at times moved north of QL1 (230948). The 240 NVA Bn remains widely dispersed and has not been identified at one specific location. It is believed, based on agent reports, that some elements of this battalion moved back into the province and are operating north of Truon Gio District. The local Force Companies and the Village Guerrilla Units remained in their normal operating areas with no significant change in operations, strength, or equipment.

b. Enemy Disposition at the End of Reporting Period:

| | |
|------------|-------------|
| 482 LF Bn | VIC 2T 2632 |
| 840 MF Bn | VIC 2N 4248 |
| 186 MF Bn | VIC 2N 0948 |
| 240 NVA Bn | VIC 2N 2952 |
| 481 LF Bn | |
| C-1 | VIC 2T 2002 |
| C-2 | VIC 2S 1519 |
| C-3 | VIC 4E 5547 |
| 480 LF Co | VIC 4E 4079 |
| 430 LF Co | VIC 4X 9722 |

4. Enemy Activities:

a. During the period there were few contacts where units were identified.

b. Elements of the 186 MF Bn were identified in contact along QL1 (vic 489829) on 17 June. The contact was in the form of an enemy initiated ambush involving 2 1/2 Coy. The tactics used were typical of those used previously by the 186 MF Bn. A Red Check was called after the contact identified the unit in the contact to be the 186 MF Bn supported by elements of the 240 NVA Bn.

c. All other identifiable contacts were with LF elements indicating that the Main Force elements remained in their base camp areas rebuilding and resupplying.

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5. Significant Intelligence Activity:

a. During the month of May, June and July contact with enemy forces was light. Enemy units in the Binh Thuan area withdrew to secret base areas in mountain areas to recover from losses suffered during the Tet Offensive in February. Research from documents and interrogation of POW's and Ho Chi Minh indicates that enemy units have been directed by MR-6 to break-down into squad size elements for the purpose of conducting harassing attacks against RV/MIL outposts and pacified areas. During the reporting period few confirmed contacts with North Force units were made.

b. During the month of May, TF 3-506 experienced light contact with the enemy.

c. During the month of June, TF 3-506 continued operations primarily concerned with pacification. As a result, fewer contacts were made with the enemy; however, intelligence sources indicated the VC were having an increasingly difficult task of obtaining food and supplies. Joint US/VN operations resulted in considerable disruption of the VC infrastructure through the use of cordons and search operations.

d. The month of July was the most active period with respect to VC attacks. Snipers were very active during this period although no units of the 3-506th Infantry were attacked. Standoff mortar attacks increased sharply during this period. As of 13 July pacification by US forces in Binh Thuan Province was de-emphasized. More US offensive operations were conducted to increase pressure on enemy forces in outlying areas, thereby relieving the population centers of enemy pressure. The effects of these operations were notable as standoff attacks ceased. The VC offensive, anticipated to occur around 20 July, did not materialize. During the month of July sizeable amounts of rice and food supplies were captured and/or destroyed. Ho Chi Minh reported the VC to be suffering from lack of food supplies. There was also a marked increase in the number of Ho Chi Minh who rallied during this period.

Section 2, Lessons Learned: Considered Observation, Evaluation, and Recommendation.

a. Personnel: None

b. Operations: Operating with smaller than platoon size elements.

1. OBSERVATION: Personnel should be broken down into units smaller than platoon size when operating in the lowlands of Binh Thuan Province.

2. EVALUATION: During the month of July the platoons of the 3-506th Infantry were employed differently than they had been in the past. Little contact was made during the reporting period using company and platoon size elements. The VC can detect the movement of large elements and avoid them or just move out of the path of the approaching units. It was decided to use smaller than platoon-size elements for successful ambush operations. Two platoons in the battalion were divided into two elements and each of the elements remained sufficiently close to aid one another if a major contact developed. Since operating in this new configuration, the platoons have succeeded in sighting and engaging many more VC elements than in the past. By going into this type of operation, it is felt the battalion is keeping the VC on the run by thoroughly covering a larger area.

3. RECOMMENDATION: That if the VC do not intend to operate in large forces but remain in from 3-to 10-man elements, it is much more effective to operate in smaller than platoon size forces; however, it must be emphasized that each element must be capable of paying to the support of the other if needed.

c. Training: Sniper Training within Separate Battalions.

1. OBSERVATION: There should be a Sniper Training Program within the

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NO. 3-506

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 3d Detachment (Abn) 506th Infantry for the Period Ending 31 July 1969.


18 August 1969

3-506 Infantry in order to attain and maintain the number of qualified snipers that are needed in the battalion.

2. EVALUATION: It has been found that the number of allocations given to the 3-506 Infantry to send qualified marksmen to a Sniper Training School is not sufficient to meet the demands of the battalion. A large part of the battalion AO is made up of terrain and vegetation that permits snipers to be very effectively utilized. It is also anticipated that by employing school-trained snipers as instructors, a very effective and efficient Sniper Training Program can be set up within the battalion. This battalion is currently in the process of setting up such a program. At present the battalion, utilizing all quotas allocated, has only nine qualified snipers. The battalion is authorized 24 snipers, but to provide depth it intends to train and maintain a minimum of 30 snipers. Two snipers in each rifle platoon, six in the Reconnaissance Platoon, and six in reserve to be used when the tactical situation requires more snipers to be employed.

3. RECOMMENDATION: That separate battalions which, because of the separate status, location, or mission, do not have the opportunity to send qualified personnel to a Sniper Training School, establish a school within their battalion, utilizing school trained snipers as instructors.

- d. Intelligence: None
- e. Logistics: None
- f. Organization: None
- g. Other: None



JAMES N. BOWERS
LTJG, Infantry
Commanding

- 2 Incls
- 1-Task Force Organization
- 2- Combat After Action Report
Pacification & Fair-Off
Operations

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AVFA-CC-11151 (18 Aug 69) 1st Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 3d Battalion (Abn), 506th
Infantry for the Period Ending 31 July 1969

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350 18 AUG 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVNGO-DST,
APO 96375

1. (U) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and concurs.
2. (C) The following comments are submitted:

a. Reference para 3b: This headquarters held the following locations for indicated units as of 31 July 69:

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>PROBABLE LOCATION</u> |
|-------------|--------------------------|
| 482A LF Bn | AN7422 |
| 482 LF Bn | ZT1113 |
| 840 MF Bn | BN3848 |
| 186 MF Bn | BN0936 |
| 240 NVA Bn | AN9624 |
| 481 LF Bn | ZT1514 |
| C-1 | ZT2007 |
| 480 LF Co | ZT9520 |
| 430 LF Co | BN1620 |

b. Reference Section II para 61: Concur with evaluation in that 3/506th Inf received only 2 quotas per month for sniper training with the 9th Inf Div prior to its re-deployment. Arrangements have been made for the 3/506th Inf to resume sniper training with the 101st Abn Div. Concur with the recommendation that battalion level sniper training be conducted. Reports received by this headquarters from 3/506th Inf indicate that the unit is presently short some items of sniper equipment but requisitions were submitted on 8 July 69. Upon receipt of this equipment sniper training conducted by the battalion will be possible.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


FREDERICK E. HOLLAND
1LT AGO,
ASST AG

Copy Furn:
1 - TF South
1 - 3/506th Inf
2 - ACSIPOB, DA

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AVNCO-DST (10 Aug 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 3d Battalion (Abn), 506th Infantry for the Period ending 31 July 1969, HCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 5 OCT 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOB-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, 3d Battalion, (Airborne) 506th Infantry.

2. (C) Reference item concerning "Sniper Training within Separate Battalions", section II, page 6, paragraph 2c; nonconcur. The establishment of an effective sniper program is dependent on qualified sniper instructors, adequate training facilities, and an expert gunsmith. The expense incurred in the procurement of sniper weapons and the shortage of qualified instructors will not permit the establishment of a sniper school below division level. This headquarters has initiated a request to DA for the establishment of a sniper instructor training course to meet the growing requirements in Vietnam.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy fuxx:
3/506th Inf
I FFV

GPOF-DT (18 Aug 69) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 3d Battalion (Airborne), 506th
Infantry for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RGS GSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 17 OCT 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


C. L. SHORT
CPE, AGC
Asst AG

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SUBJECT: 1951 YEAR ORGANIZATION

1. The Task Organization of Task Force 3-506th Infantry at the beginning of the reporting period was as shown below:

- a. HHC, 3-506th Infantry
- b. Co A, 3-506th Infantry
- c. Co B, 3-506th Infantry
- d. Co C, 3-506th Infantry
- e. Co D, 3-506th Infantry
- f. Co E, 3-506th Infantry
 - (1) Recon Platoon
 - (2) 4.2" Mortar Platoon
 - (3) 60mm Mortar Platoon
- g. 1 squad HHC, 326th Engineers (attached)
- h. Btry D, 2-320th Artillery

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD 501 5200.10

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ENCLOSURE 1

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 3d BATTALION (ABN), 506th INFANTRY
APO US FORCES 96317

ATDG-AR-0

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report

TO: Commanding General, IFFORCEV, APO 96350
Commanding General, 100th Airborne Division APO 96389
Commanding Officer, Task Force South, APO 96304
Deputy War Game, IFFORCEV, APO 96350
Commanding Officer, MACV Advisory Team 27, APO 96317

1. Name and Identity and/or Type of Operations:
Facilitation and Fair-off Operations.
2. Date of Operations:
27 April 1969 thru 30 June 1969
3. Location of Operations:
Thanh Hoa District, Binh Thuan Province, RVN (SO SHERIDAN)
4. Command and Control Headquarters:
Task Force South
5. Reporting Officer:
1st Lt Michael A. Riven, Commanding Officer, 3d Bn (Abn), 506th Inf (Airmobile)
6. Task Organization:
3d Bn (Abn), 506th Inf, 101st Abn Div
D-2/200th Artillery (AS)
Trigon C-1: Sub-sector
162 Regional Force Company
200 Regional Force Company
203 Regional Force Company
7. Supporting Forces:
G Btry, 5-22 Arty (AS)
B Btry, 5-27 Arty (AS)
A Btry, 5-27 Arty (AS)
USAF, TAC Air
172nd AHC (-) (AS)
Binh Thuan Sector
Trigon C-1: PPTF Plt
8th FSOFS Bn
Vietnamese Information Service (VIS)
Vietnamese Pay-Mat
Binh Thuan Province National Gienoi Center
Revolutionary Development Cadre
8. Intelligence:
a. In the inhibition of TF 3-506 pacification operations the enemy disposition within the TAOX was as follows:

(1) The 482 LF Bn had not been identified since contact vicinity AN 70475 on Mar 69. A PW captured in this contact stated that the unit at that time consisted of 130 personnel due to heavy losses suffered in February. Elements of the 482 LF Bn continued to infiltrate the Triangle Area to receive supplies from VC and guerrilla elements operating along Highway 82. Information was also obtained from several Viet Chinese who rallied from local guerrilla elements to the OVN in order to avoid induction into the 482 LF Bn.

(2) The 430 LF Co continued to operate vicinity AN 8319 with an estimated strength of 30 personnel. The 430 LF Co identified on 14 May 69 as a combined ambush position of A Co, 3-506th Infantry and the 300 RF Co engaged elements of the LF Co which were acting as security for a propaganda element operating in the vicinity of Binh Lam (II), vicinity AN 8618.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 3d BATTALION (ABN), 506th INFANTRY
APO US FORCES 96317

AVDC-AF-A

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report

TO: Commanding General, IFFUCGTF, APO 96350
Commanding General, 100th Airborne Division APO 96389
Commanding Officer, Task Force South, APO 96304
Deputy War Game, IFFUCGTF, APO 96350
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4. Command and Control Headquarters:
Task Force South
5. Reporting Officer:
LTJ Michael A. Riven, Commanding Officer, 3d Bn (Abn), 506th Inf (Airmobile)
6. Task Organization:
3d Bn (Abn), 506th Inf, 101st Abn Div
D-2/20th Artillery (56)
Truyen Gio: Sub-sector
162 Regional Force Company
370 Regional Force Company
503 Regional Force Company
7. Supporting Forces:
G Btry, 5-22 Arty (OS)
B Btry, 5-27 Arty (OS)
A Btry, 5-27 Arty (OS)
USAF, TAC Air
172nd AHC (-) (OS)
Binh Thuan Sector
Truyen Gio PFFV Plt
8th FSCOFB Co
Vietnamese Information Service (VIS)
Vietnamese Pay-Mor
Binh Thuan Province National Chieu Hai Center
Revolutionary Development Cadre
8. Intelligence:
a. In the initiation of TF 3-506 pacification operations the enemy disposition within the THOR was as follows:

(1) The 402 LF Bn had not been identified since contact vicinity AN 70475 on Mar 69. A PW captured in this contact stated that the unit at that time consisted of 130 personnel due to heavy losses suffered in February. Elements of the 402 LF Bn continued to infiltrate the Triangle area to receive supplies from VC and guerrilla elements operating along Highway 82. Information was also obtained from several VC Chienhs who rallied from local guerrilla elements to the DRV in order to avoid induction into the 402 LF Bn.

(2) The 430 LF Co continued to operate vicinity AN 8319 with an estimated strength of 30 personnel. The 430 LF Co identified on 14 May 69 as a combined ambush position of A Co, 3-506th Infantry and the 300 RF Co engaged elements of the LF Co which were acting as security for a propaganda element operating in the vicinity of Binh Lam (II), vicinity AN 8618.

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report .

(3) The 450 LF Co, with an estimated strength of 35 personnel, initially operated in the northern section of the Le Hong Phong, vicinity AR 9024; however, once pacification efforts were directed against Tay Hoa (7), vicinity AR 9017, the unit deployed into the southern portion of the Le Hong Phong, vicinity AR 9015. In conjunction with local guerrilla elements, the 450 LF Co continually harassed friendly elements in Tay Hoa and Hoa Vinh Villages. In the early morning hours of 6 June 69 the 450 LF Co divided into two platoons with one entering Hoa Vinh (7), vicinity AR 90205, and the other entering Tay Hoa (7). Both VC elements were engaged by friendly ambush positions. Documents taken off of VC KIA identified the 450 LF Co in both instances.

(4) In the vicinity of Hoa Gio District HQs, the most active guerrilla element throughout the reporting period was the Nam Pha (V) guerrillas with a reported strength of 26 personnel. Along Hwy 8B, the Nam Canh (V) guerrilla, and associated VCI cadre, continued to be the main suppliers for the 402 LF BN and the 430 LF Co. The guerrilla platoon of Hoa Chinh was estimated at 42 strong with the VCI active elements estimated at 60 personnel. Various hamlet Arrow Action Teams operated throughout the pacification area of operations with an average team strength of 10 personnel. Primarily a propaganda arm, the AATs were virtually eliminated within Phase I hamlets of the Province RO program as the basic necessity to open to overfly was denied to them by combined ambush positions within and around the target areas.

b. Jordan and search operations elsewhere conducted initially within the target areas were aimed at eliminating VCI. Coordination was conducted daily with Vinh Gio DUCO by means of the 3-506 MI Bat which was attached to the Battalion Light CP located at Hoa Gio District HQs. Jointly produced blacklists resulted in the capture of 9 FCI while several combat operations resulted in the identification of 3 VC KIA from Tay Hoa (V). The Voluntary Informant Program produced no significant results during Phase I. This lack of success was basically due to the fact that VC sympathizers created fear among the populace by threatening any individual who gave information to the US or AR soldiers.

c. Documents taken from 3 VC KIA by Reconnaissance Team 46, vicinity AR 901463, on 12 Jun 69, correlated with documents captured by A/2/1 Coy, on 12 Jun 69, and indicated a similar statement for the enemy elements within Binh Thuan Province. This mission called for closer coordination between Main Force, Local Force, and guerrilla elements, along with the initiation of "guerrilla warfare" against GVN pacification efforts. It appeared that the enemy Main Force element had broken up into small elements to operate with Local Force Companies. As Phase I of Pacification Operations came to a close it was obvious that the enemy had broken up into small platoons also elements to conduct harassing activities while selectively choosing his targets for large scale assaults.

9. Mission:

The mission of RF 3-506 was to support the Revolutionary Development Program of Binh Thuan Province.

10. Concept of Operations:

RF 3-506 pacification operations employed the dual concept of securing the populace within the target hamlets while upgrading the RF/AR elements by conducting small unit pair-off operations in and around the hamlets. Initially a target hamlet would be subjected to a combat and search operation, with US and AR units conducting the hamlet, while the Hoa Gio National Police Field Force (NFPF) platoon and Police Special Branch (PSB) personnel searched the hamlet and questioned the people. ARVN and US Psychological Warfare Teams, Chieu Hoi Teams, and Medical Teams would then operate within the hamlet continuously. Once it was deemed appropriate the border would be withdrawn and pair-off operations would commence. This concept called for AR/US squad and platoon for platoon ambushes and screening operations, consisting of combined ambush positions within and on the periphery of the hamlets. Once satisfactory results had been achieved by this type of operations and consolidation of the hamlets defenses had been accomplished, the final stage of direct protection within the hamlet was left solely to the RF/AR elements with US elements then being able to conduct screening operations along the VC infiltration routes outside of the hamlets.

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21 APR 69: Central Operation Area Action Report

Time with direct and indirect security was provided to the people within the hamlets along with the RF cadre who would then be able to operate on a 24 hour basis.

11. Operations:

On 27 Apr 69, A Company (-), TF 3-506 was inserted into Thien Gio District, Tay Son Village, vicinity AN 060217, in combined pacification operations with the 300 RF Company. The A Company (-) was established with the 300 RF Company (-) in an outpost centered within Tam Hung (V). Ambush positions were immediately established with one US squad and one RF squad. On 30 Apr 69, a conference at Binh Thuan Province Headquarters was held for the purpose of coordinating pacification operations, to determine target villages and hamlets, and to establish areas of operation. Attendees at this conference were:

Q1, 23 Infantry Division (ARVN)
 Q2, East Zone South
 Q3, Task Force 3-506
 S5, 23 Infantry Division (ARVN)
 Province Chief, Binh Thuan Province
 S1, Binh Thuan Province
 G9, 14th ARVN Regiment
 S4, 14th ARVN Regiment

It was decided that TF 3-506 would establish a Light Command Post at Thien Gio District Headquarters. Priority for TF 3-506 pacification efforts were Hoa Yen (N), vicinity AN 900170, and Hoa Dong (H), vicinity AN 900175. Prior coordination with the Thien Gio District Chief and Sector District Advisor by Q2, TF 3-506 result a in pacification operations directed against the following schools:

| | |
|--------------|----------|
| Tan Hung (1) | AN075977 |
| Tan Hung (2) | AN080217 |
| An Pha | AN866215 |
| Van Giao | AN867230 |
| Tan Phuoc | AN868245 |
| Son Hoa | AN071260 |

It was mutually agreed on 30 Apr 69, that the Binh Thuan Province Chief would release the following units to the direct command of the Thien Gio District Chief:

510 RF Company
 809 RF Company
 263 RF Company
 164 RF Company
 370 RF Company
 704 RF Company

An order published on 7 May 69 by Province Headquarters directed pacification operations in the hamlets of Son Dien (AN598220), Hoa Thinh (AN905235), and Hoa Hoa (AN861305). Although these target areas had not been previously coordinated and agreed upon, TF 3-506 integrated Hoa Hoa and Hoa Thinh hamlets into Phase I pacification efforts. Due to the lack of available assets and the slow progress of RF elements, the hamlet of Hoa Hoa was suspended until Phase II.

a. TF 3-506 displaced a Light CP to Thien Gio District Headquarters on 1 May 69 to assist pacification operations and coordinate with ARVN District staff and US advisors. On 2 May 69, two US squads and crews were attached to Company A, to provide fire support and illumination for combined attacks.

b. On 090403Z May 1969, Companies B and C, TF 3-506 commenced a combined operation with the 263 and 164 RF Companies by conducting a search and sweep of Tay Son Village (Hoa Yen & Hoa Dong hamlets). Twenty-seven VC suspects were detained by USA from Thien Gio. Four of these suspects were classified as Active VC apprehenders. Physical, civic action, and psychological operations were conducted in conjunction with the search and sweep operations.

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SECRET: Cont. Operation House Hien Report

The cordon around Tay Hien (V) was maintained for three days with the 100th AF of 10 Teams 4 and 11 co-locating with the CP of Company C nightly. On 7 May 69, 4 Red Guards rallied at 17 outpost 308A, vicinity AF 960300. Upon interrogation the Red Guards stated that they had attempted to rally at Tay Hien (V), but were afraid to do so when they observed the US forces around their native village. On 8 May 69, two Red Guards who rallied the 1st platoon of Company C to a house containing a radio which concealed VC documents and a GIUCOM grenade. In addition, the Red Guards pointed out the infiltration routes into the village and the homes and relatives of service VC. Once the cordon was withdrawn, Company C teamed with the 164 AF Company and began ambush operation in and around the village. Company B and 203 RF Company conducted screening operations to the east of the village in the Lo Huec Forest in an effort to intercept VC penetration attempts. On 10 May 69, two 81mm mortars and crews were inserted into Tay Hien (V) to support Companies B and C, TF 3-506, and the 164 and 203 RF Companies.

b. At 040730H May 69, vicinity AF 831202, 1/1/3-506 and 1 squad from the 303 RF Company engaged an estimated VC platoon. Artillery and 1920 M41 gasdroids supported the contact which was broken at 0337 hours. Results were 1 RF KIA, 5 VC KIA, 1 M-47 rocket captured, and 1 B-40 rocket launcher destroyed. At 110045H May 69, vicinity AF 853206, 2/1/3-506 operating independently to the northeast of Tay Hien also captured 2 VC, 1 RPG B3 885, one 7.62 GIUCOM pistol, and one rocket launcher containing propaganda literature. Interrogation of the RVs revealed that they had participated in the contact with 1/1/3-506 earlier in the day which occurred after they had withdrawn from the (H) where they had conducted a propaganda assault. On 20 May 69, Company D was inserted into the Tay Hien (V) area to replace Company B in its patrol operations with the 203 RF Company. At 052108H May 69, vicinity AF 898228, 3/1/3-506 while in its Night Defensive Position engaged 2 VC with small arms and claymores. The engagement resulted in negative friendly casualties and 1 VC KIA with 1 SKS captured.

c. At 0100H on 2 June 69, vicinity AF 905209, Company D (-) in conjunction with the 203 RF and 168 RF Companies, cordoned the hamlets of Non Thanh (1) and Non Thanh (2). During the initial stages of the cordon, elements from D-5, TF 3-506, the 6th PSYOPS Field Team and VIS conducted psychological operations. The cordon was maintained for three days, at which time Company D and the 203 RF Company then resumed combined operations within the two hamlets.

d. At 080145H June 69, vicinity AF 855223, 2/1/3-506 engaged 4 VC with small arms fire. Contact was broken at 1630 hours resulting in negative friendly casualties and 2 VC KIA. On 3 June 69, vicinity AF 902167, 1/3-506, in its NDP, received 12 rounds of 60mm mortar fire resulting in 3 US KIA and 1 SF KIA. At 060045H June 69, vicinity AF 890124, Company C and the 164 AF Company continued CP received 5 rounds of 60mm mortar fire, 2 B-40 rockets, 12 hand grenades, and small arms fire. Contact was broken at 0200 hours. Results were 1 US KIA, 1 RF KIA, 2 US KIA, 7 RF KIA, while the enemy sustained 3 VC KIA, 1 B-40, 4 B-40 rockets and 14 GIUCOM grenades captured. At 080300H June 69, vicinity AF 899201, 1/1/3-506 engaged an estimated VC squad with claymores and M-79 fire resulting in 1 VC KIA, 160 rounds captured by Company C and Company D contact on 6 June 69 identified the 160 RF Company. On 7 June 69, at 0215 hours, vicinity AF 902167, 1/1/3-506 received 11 rounds of 60mm mortar fire from the vicinity of Non Hien (S). 0200H. The cordon operation around Non Hien (H) by elements of Company E was disrupted by a combined element from Company A and the 303 RF Company which was contact-resisted into position on 10 June 69. At 0130 hours, 11 June 69, the cordon was in place around Non Hien (H). Fourteen VC suspects were detained by Company E in place around Non Hien (H). Fourteen VC suspects were detained by Company E in place around Non Hien (H) due to the area and forced to operate in Tay Hien (V) because of the presence of the presence of Company C, TF 3-506.

e. During the night of 29 May 69, the 70 blew up a culvert along Hwy 33, vicinity AF 857235. The culvert was 80% destroyed. At 100030H May 69, a hamlet at 050000H was completely destroyed by aerial charges vicinity AF 856216. On 1 June 69, vicinity AF 802217, a hamlet at 050000H was 75% destroyed by plastic explosives and aerial charges.

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These terrorist actions prevented the deployment of one platoon from Company A, TF 3-506 on 14 Jan 69. This platoon was divided into three squads with each squad operating in conjunction with the Popular Force (PF) platoons responsible for three separate hamlets along Hwy 8B. Two or three times nightly a US/PF element would patrol throughout the hamlet. Initially this tactic met with little enemy resistance other than sniper fire. A mortar, on 14 Jan 69, at 2030 hours, vicinity BN 886220, was such combined patrol was engaged by an unknown VC VC resulting in 3 US KIA, 3 PF KIA, 1 M-2 machine gun, 1 VC KIA and 1 VC captured. Since the combined patrol concept was later abandoned within the three hamlets, no other terrorist incidents or activities were noted during Phase I.

3. Enemy activity detected by combined US/PF and US/FP elements primarily consisted of small scale actions with brief exchanges of fire. Sniper fire and enemy movement was a nightly occurrence throughout all three target areas. Psychological operations within the Phase I hamlets were directed to the mothers and wives of known VC as a means of inducing the reluctance of the VC to continue the VC to rally to the OVN. Leaflet drops were made over the target hamlets emphasizing the Voluntary Infiltration Program. PD cadre operations were directed at convincing the people that the OVN was in their hamlets to stay and that gold-ruble and cold determination by the people themselves would be guaranteed. This promise was delivered on the 12th and 15th of June 1969 when local hamlet and village elections were held within the target hamlets.

12. Results:

- Friendly - US KIA 2
- US KIA 7
- PF KIA 3
- PF KIA 0
- PF KIA 3

- Enemy - VC KIA 29
- VC PW 5

- Weapons - 2 AK-47, 1 B-40, 2 PR-43 SWS,
- 1 Chinese 7.62mm pistol, 2 SIG,
- 1 M-1

- VOI KIA 3
- VOI KIA 9
- Mort. Launch 7
- Misc - 1 B-40 (lost), 6 B-40 rds, 19 Chinese Grenades,
- 1 US canteen, 4 US steel pots, 1 Chinese flag,
- 13 rucksacks, 2,300 lbs of rice, 67 lbs of documents.

13. Administrative Matters:

a. Logistics:

(1) While TF 3-506 supported was operating on Pacific War Operations the resupply cycle of three days normally consisted of the following items:

- 5 claymore mines
- 5 fragmentation grenades
- 12 area grenades
- 500 rounds 5.56mm ammunition
- 1000 rounds 7.62mm ammunition
- 10 hand flares
- 2 area M-79 ammunition

(2) The Air Sea mortar tubes in support of Van Hung (T) and Tay Hoa (U) areas consisted of a basic load as follows:

- 150 rounds LB
- 125 rounds illumination
- 50 rounds WP

SECTION: Combat Operations After Action Report

ing in the villages. Such action would provide immediate reaction to enemy initiated incidents and would provide the establishment of aordon around a target area as it developed.

3. It was noted that when provided the proper support, RF forces would actively engage the enemy and participate in virtually any mission. The PF elements, however, still require more support and organization by US forces. It is recommended that coordination operations between RF and PF elements be initiated by briefing some RF elements to operate in ambush positions in the vicinity of their hamlets as well as the concept of nightly patrolling within the hamlet. Initially this combined operation should be supervised and controlled by US elements could be withdrawn.

4. On May 8 1969, as the action around Tay Hoa (V) was being withdrawn and combined ambush operations were about to be initiated, it was determined that construction of the defensive positions within the village would be necessary. The CO, TF 3-506 was informed by the SA, Binh Thuan Province, after acquiring as to the defensive plan for Tay Hoa (V), that there was no plan in existence as that time. It would seem to have been more effective if concrete results could have been demonstrated to the personnel of Tay Hoa (V) immediately. Before such operational elements, detailed plans for each step of the entire operation should be formulated.

5. Initially, great difficulty was encountered in the positioning of the RF elements. The concept of static defensive positions outside the hamlet actually resulted in RF supporting and protecting themselves rather than the people. Once the RF move into an area, pacification is worthless unless the people can be protected. Companies should be constructed so as to be contiguous with the hamlet or village. In addition, ambush positions on the periphery of the hamlet should be employed as well as patrols through the hamlet which do not follow a pattern. Moving ambushes, using three or four different locations within the hamlet each night without establishing a pattern should also be used.

6. Difficulty was also encountered in obtaining the nightly ambush locations of separate Vietnamese elements on a daily basis. Liaison Advisors must impress upon District Officials the necessity of acquiring these locations as soon as possible. In addition, these locations must be secured. District Officials must insure that separate Vietnamese elements are in positions that have been pre-planned.

7. The most difficult problem encountered by TF 3-506 during pacification and air-off operations was that of communications. Inter-people are an absolute necessity, especially when rapid air-land operations are conducted with RF/PF units. Even in the case of a combined ambush position it is imperative that each individual be aware of the status and location of his element as well as other ambush locations. Also each individual must be able to talk to someone of his element in case of separation or contact with the enemy. The problem of communication also extends to the need of sufficient radios to support numerous ambush locations.

8. Without adequate support the RF/PF cannot function. These I pacification efforts were hampered and delayed by the lack of equipment supplied by Troops to the District. In addition, supplies that were supposed to have been put aside for the target hamlets and villages to be used when required for the construction of defensive positions within and around the hamlets were reportedly non-existent. These supplies which eventually went their way down to the individual RF/PF soldier in the target areas were minimal. It should be noted that while supplies

3. USMC: Combat Operations After 1968 Stoppage

Expenditures of USMC mortar ammunition during Phase I pacification operations was as follows:

2,477 rounds M1
576 rounds illumination
117 rounds M7

(2) VC B-506 supported the 300, 264 and 253 RF Companies on a regular basis. Mortar resupply for these elements through Vietnamese channels was totally insufficient and rendered them practically incapable of sustaining themselves. (This construction had been completed on bridge work, supplies such as munitions, clothing, shoes, grenades, etc. were furnished to the defending units. Total supplies furnished these RF and BS elements during Phase I of pacification operations were as follows:

120 claymore mines
10 cases M-79 ammunition
2 cases M30 mol mortar
700 fragmentation grenades
50 five gallon water jugs
20 rolls of acoustic wire
5 rolls of barbed wire
10 pickets
500 canteens
9,700 bandages

b. Medical:

Medical missions were conducted in conjunction with ground operations and occasionally at other times in the target hamlets. Treatment of hamlet residents was conducted on a daily basis by the medical assigned to each of the Companies. Support operations continued in support of RF and BS elements, as well as civilians, injured by VC terrorists. These BS personnel were extended the same considerations and offered the same response as that received by US forces.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques: Not applicable

15. Commander's Analysis:

a. The pairing off of RF units with one Company is the only way that the RF will be upgraded and supported and should continue.

(1) While the Province Chief gave the District Chief the mission of pacifying and assigned 5 Companies to the task, he placed additional stress on the target units making them ineffective for pacification road clearing, static defense of outposts. Therefore, only 2 platoons of each company were actively committed during Phase I.

b. Checkpointing the hamlet at night with RF can be extremely effective. This method divides the hamlet into sectors for 3 men with claymores and grenades and small arms. One in position they absolutely do not move. Since a carrier has been injured, the men in each "square" stress at anything in their square. This can be successfully done with strict discipline by the soldiers and eliminate small group infiltration.

c. A greater road for interpreters exists and must be available especially when American squads are working with RF platoons.

d. VC known past also necessary each paired-off RF Company for daily withdrawal of equipment and the collection of ambush positions.

16. Administrative and Training Recommendations:

a. District Chiefs should be allocated, directly under his control, necessary forces to accomplish his mission in direct proportion to the population within his District and the strength of enemy forces present.

Summary: Combat Operations in the Hanoi Region

1. In the district, such action would enable immediate reaction to enemy initiated incursions and would permit the establishment of a cordon around a target area as it developed.

b. It was noted that when provided the proper support, RF forces would definitely engage the enemy and participate in virtually any action. The RF elements, however, could not be used in a wide area controlled by VC forces. It is recommended that operations of this nature between RF and PF elements be initiated by heading down RF elements to operate in ambush positions in the vicinity of their hamlets as well as the concept of nightly patrolling within the hamlet. Initially this combined operation should be initiated and supervised by US elements which could be withdrawn.

c. On May 8 1969, as the cordon around Tay Hoa (V) was being withdrawn and sustained ambush operations were about to be initiated, it was estimated that construction of the defensive positions within the village was complete. The 03, TF 1-506 was informed by the 01, Binh Thuan Province, after inquiring as to the defensive plan for Tay Hoa (V), that there was a plan in existence at that time. It would have been more effective if concrete results could have been demonstrated to the populace of Tay Hoa (V) immediately. Before such operations commence, detailed plans for each step of the entire operation should be formulated.

d. Initially, great difficulty was encountered in the positioning of the RF elements. The concept of stable defensive positions around the hamlet actually resulted in RF supervising and protecting themselves rather than the people. Once the RF move into an area, pacification is worthless unless the people can be protected. Camps should be constructed so as to be contiguous with the hamlet or village. In addition, ambush positions on the periphery of the hamlet should be employed as well as patrols through the hamlet which do not follow a pattern. Roving ambushes, using three or four different locations within the hamlet each night without establishing a pattern should also be used.

e. Difficulty was also encountered in obtaining the nightly ambush locations of separate Vietnamese elements on a timely basis. District advisors must impress upon District Officials the necessity of supplying these locations as soon as possible. In addition, these locations must be accurate. District Officials must insure that separate Vietnamese elements are in positions that have been pre-planned.

f. The most difficult problem encountered by TF 1-506 during pacification and pair-off operations was that of communications. Inter-personnel are an absolute necessity, especially when ground size ambush operations are conducted with RV/RF units. Due to the size of a combined squad ambush position it is imperative that each individual be aware of the location and identity of his element as well as other ambush locations. Also each individual must be able to talk to members of his ambush in case of separation or contact with the enemy. The problem of communication also extends to the need of sufficient radios to support numerous ambush operations.

g. Without adequate support the RV/RF cannot function. These 1 Fortification efforts were hampered and delayed by the lack of equipment supplied by the VC to the District. In addition, supplies that were supposed to have been put aside for the target hamlets and villages do to user area required for the construction of defensive positions within and around the hamlets were reportedly non-existent. These supplies which eventually made their way down to the individual RV/RF soldier in the rural areas were minimal. It should be noted that while supplies

SUBJECT: Combat Operations At War Action Report

ing in the field. Such action would enable immediate reaction to enemy initiated incidents and would permit the establishment of a cordon around a target area as it developed.

b. It was noted that when provided the proper support, RF forces would actively control the enemy and coordinate the virtually unaided. The RF elements, however, could function more effectively if supported by US forces. It is recommended that coordination efforts be continued by RF and PF elements by breaking down RF elements to operate in ambush positions in the vicinity of their hamlets as well as the concept of nightly patrolling within the hamlet. Initially this combined operation should be supervised and controlled by US elements which could be withdrawn.

c. On May 8 1960, as the cordon around Tay Hoa (V) was being withdrawn and combined ambush operations were about to be initiated, it was recommended that construction of the defensive positions within the village be completed. The CO, VP 3-206 was informed by the SA, Binh Thuan Province, after inquiring as to the defensive plan for Tay Hoa (V), that there was a plan in existence at that time. It would have been more effective if concrete training could have been demonstrated to the populace of Tay Hoa (V) immediately. Before such operations commence, detailed plans for each step of the entire operation should be formulated.

d. Initially, great difficulty was encountered in the positioning of the RF elements. The concept of stable defensive positions aside the hamlet actually resulted in RF supporting and protecting themselves rather than the people. Once the RF were into an area, pacification is worthless unless the people can be protected. Camps should be constructed so as to be contiguous with the hamlet or village. In addition, ambush positions in the periphery of the hamlet should be employed as well as patrols through the hamlet which do not follow a pattern. Moving ambushes, using three or four different locations within the hamlet each night without establishing a pattern should also be used.

e. Difficulty was also encountered in obtaining the nightly ambush locations of captured Vietnamese elements on a timely basis. District advisors must impress upon District Officials the necessity of acquiring these locations as soon as possible. In addition, these locations must be accurate. District Officials must insure that captured Vietnamese elements are in positions that have been pre-planned.

f. The most difficult problem encountered by VP 3-206 during pacification and pair-off operations was that of communications. Interference was an absolute necessity, especially when squad size ambush operations are conducted with RF/PF units. Due to the size of a combined squad ambush position it is imperative that each individual be aware of the location and location of his element as well as other ambush locations. Also each individual must be able to talk to members of his squad in case of separation or contact with the enemy. The problem of communication also extends to the need of sufficient radios to support numerous ambush locations.

g. Without adequate support the RF/PF cannot function. These I Pacific Area efforts were hampered and delayed by the lack of equipment supplied by the district. In addition, supplies that were supposed to have been put aside for the target hamlets and villages to be used when required for the construction of defensive positions within and around the hamlets were reportedly non-existent. Green supplies which eventually reach their way down to the individual RF/PF soldier in the rural areas were minimal. It should be noted that while supplies

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have non-existent for the villages of Hoa Hong, Tay Hoa and Hoa Vinh which total a population of 2200, the construction of a wire bent barricade has been started around the western portion of the city of Phan Thiet.

FOR THE COMMANDER

John V. Gallucci
JOHN V. GALLUCCI
Major, Infantry
8-3

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were non-existent for the villages of Hoa Bang, Tay Hoa and Hoa Vinh which total a population of 2000, the construction of a wire bent barricade has been started around the western portion of the city of Phan Thiet.

FOR THE COMMANDER

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13. ABSTRACT

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UA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVIQC-1ST, APO 96375

1. (U) This headquarters has evaluated subject ORLL and concurs except as indicated below.
2. (U) Subject ORLL is not prepared in accordance with AR 525-15 dated 25 Sep 69. The unit will be notified of this error and future ORLL's will be prepared in the prescribed format.
3. (C) Reference para 3a: The following units should be included:

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>STRENGTH</u> |
|---------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| a. 482A LP Bn | AR 8326 | 180 |
| b. 482B LP Bn | ZT 2523 | 130 |

FOR THE COMMANDER:

HERE

1 Incl
nc

- CP:
- 2 - ACSIPOK, DA
 - 1 - CG, 101st Airborne Division, ATTN: G3
 - 1 - CG, Task Force South
 - 1 - CG, 3d Bn (Abl), 506th Inf

RESULTS: #3 THESE UNITS WERE OMITTED FROM THE REPORT.
AR 525-15 DATED SEP. 25 69 IS NOT FULLY MET BY THE
ASSURED ME THAT WE WILL HAVE THIS RLG. BEFORE THE
NEXT REPORT IS DUE.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 3D BATTALION (AIRMOBILE) 506TH INFANTRY
APO San Francisco 96317

AVDG-AF-0

1 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 3d Battalion (Amb), 506th
Infantry, for the Period Ending 31 October 1969; RCS CS FOR-65 (R2)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities

a. Elements of the 3d Bn (Amb) 506th Inf, were involved in combat, combined, and pair-off and pacification operations during the reporting period. Training was conducted concurrent with these operations and during periods when units were refitting and preparing for future operations.

b. Task Force 3-506 participated in the following operations during the reporting period:

(1) Pacification and Pair-off Operations (Unnamed): 1 August to 3 September 1969

(2) Small unit operations (Unnamed): 1 August to 31 October 1969.

(3) Combined US/ARVN Pair-off operations (COBRA Tears): 1 August to 31 October 1969.

(4) Rose Flow Security Operations (Unnamed): 19 August to 26 September 1969.

(5) Task Force South combined US/ARVN battalion size operation (Hancock Flame): 27 September to 8 October 1969.

(6) Task Force 3-506 battalion (-) operations (Unnamed): 9 October to 31 October 1969.

c. Mission:

(1) Conduct search and destroy/reconnaissance-in-force operations against VC/NVA forces in Binh Thuan Province.

(2) Conduct pacification operations in Thien Giac District.

(3) Support Revolutionary Development in assigned AO in conjunction

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with Binh Thuan Province (Sector).

(4) Conduct combined operations with the 44th ARVN Regiment and RF/AF forces in assigned AO.

(5) Provide Security for designated installations and units as specified.

d. Location: Binh Thuan Province

e. Reporting Officer: LTC James H. Bowers

f. Task Organization: Inclosure 1

g. Operational changes: During the reporting period, pacification operations of TF 3-506 changed from active commitment to pacification/pair-off operations within the hamlets to more offensive operations on the periphery of population centers. Pacification within the hamlet of Binh Lam continued to be supported by Company G, TF 3-506, up until 8 September. The withdrawal of Company G from Binh Lam and its employment in a more offensive role marked the end of static pacification/pair-off operations by this unit. With the initiation of Rome Flow operations in the Le Nonj Phong Forest on 19 August, the battalion was given the commitment of securing the engineer and clearing elements. On termination of this and other security missions on 26 September, the battalion has been conducting combat operations with a manpower strength of three to four rifle companies. This concentration of combat power has permitted TF 3-506 to penetrate enemy base areas in mountainous terrain where in the past operations had been limited to company and platoon size operations along the coastal plain.

2. Significant Activities:

a. August

(1) On 8 August, vicinity BN130213, CO 3A Th 43 engaged an estimated three VC with small arms. The VC were wearing camouflaged fatigues and carrying weapons. Machine guns were employed and recorded one secondary explosion, vicinity BN0920. Results were: Friendly - Negative; enemy - 1 VC KIA and 1 ARV KIA. At vicinity BN047575, B-3-506 found one garden, 200 x 200 meters, and one building which she destroyed.

(2) On 9 August, vicinity Fisher Relay, it was reported that four trip flares had been set off on the western side of the mountain. US artillery was employed, resulting in one secondary explosion and one shot recorded.

(3) On 10 August, vicinity BN033561, B-3-506 found one garden, 300 x 300 meters, containing corn and squash, with several sleeping positions near-by. The garden was destroyed. At vicinity BN108137, CO 3A Th 43 spotted one VC wearing a brown shirt and moving W. No weapon was observed. At the same time, Th 43 moved in to check the area and spotted and engaged four VC wearing black pajamas. Results were: Friendly - negative; enemy - 1 VC KIA (F-male), 2 VC KIA (female and baby), and 1 baby KIA. One M-1 Carbine, 1 S&S,

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4 rucksacks, assorted documents, cooking utensils, 25-30 gallons of water, and assorted spices are CIA. 192nd AHC gunships supported the contact. Dustoff was required and completed at 1105H. At vicinity B32727, gunships from the 192nd AHC spotted and engaged an estimated 25 to 30 sampans inside of the 3,000 meter 24-hour free-fire zone cleared by Sector. The gunships reported 2 sampans sank, 15 sampans damaged and an estimated 30 VC KIA. One gunship was hit in the right skid and doorpost while the other took a hit in the left rocket pod.

(4) On 12 August, vicinity A3815160, FSB Sherry received 10 to 15 82mm mortar rounds. Counter-mortar and artillery fires were employed. Results were: Friendly - 1 US KIA, 3 US WIA; Enemy - unknown. At vicinity AN815160, FSB Sherry received an estimated five rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Counter-mortar and artillery fires were employed. Results were: 1 US KIA and 7 US WIA.

(5) On 13 August, Whiskey Welay reported sniper fire from the vicinity of A3935215. Gunships from the 192nd AHC were employed and also received small arms fire. Results were: Friendly - negative; Enemy - unknown. At vicinity B3129559, 2-D-3-506 was engaged by an estimated three VC. The VC force fired small arms and fled NE along a stream bed. US artillery was employed with unknown results. Results were: Friendly - 1 US KIA; Enemy - unknown.

(6) On 15 August, vicinity B3449403, 3-B-3-506 spotted one VC moving from the north to the south. The VC, wearing a green uniform and carrying a weapon, was engaged at 60 meters. Results were: Friendly - negative; Enemy - unknown. At vicinity B3449403, 3-B-3-506 engaged an unknown size VC force 50 meters NE of its position with claymore mines and small arms. Results were: Friendly - negative; Enemy - unknown.

(7) On 16 August, FSB Sandy received two rounds of 82mm mortar. Results were: Friendly - 2 US WIA (litter); Enemy - unknown. At vicinity B3449403, 3-B-3-506 made a sweep of the contact area. Results were: Enemy - 2 VC KIA and 2 AK-47's, 5 magazines, 5 rucksacks, assorted documents and papers; clothing, 150 lbs of rice, 2 lemons, 20 pounds of sugar and some dried fish CIA. At vicinity B1122236, COBRA Task 41 spotted 10-15 VC 4-5 kilometers away on an azimuth of 120 degrees moving east. Five inch Naval gunfire was employed. The HAF air observer estimated seven probable KIA.

(8) On 20 August, FSB Sherry received 10-15 rounds of 82mm mortar inside the perimeter. Counter-mortar and artillery fire was employed. Results were: Friendly - 1 US WIA (dustoff - litter case); Enemy - unknown.

(9) On 23 August, vicinity AN095225, COBRA Task 43 found a garden plot containing approximately 2,000 melons and 200 pumpkins, some beans, and a quantity of cucumbers. Also found were two bunkers 10'x10' with 2' OEC, a small fuel cache, and two water buckets. Everything was destroyed.

(10) On 25 August, 2-C-3-506, vicinity A3347196, received sniper fire from 100-150 meters west of their position from an estimated four VC.

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Friendlys returned fire with small arms, 82mm mortar, and artillery. Results: 1 KIA (Kit Carson Scout BN). When the 3-506 Infantry C/O ship was used to dustoff this man, it received ground fire from the VC at a distance of 100-300 meters. The C/O ship took three hits and was grounded on return to LZ Betty.

(11) On 26 August, vicinity AN343242, PSB Sandy took 3-5 82mm mortar rounds, three of which landed inside the perimeter. US artillery fired in support. Results: Friendly - 1 US KIA (dustoff), 1 fuel blivet damaged; Enemy - unknown. At vicinity AN771003, LAC 853 was sent to check a suspected enemy position. Results: one US man shot 6031-71 (Lo Hong Phong), two claymore satchels (US type), various small arms caches, 100-150, three foxholes 9' in diameter and 15' apart, two small cooking sites, aiming stakes with fresh diggings, and signs of recent travel (24 hours) were found. At vicinity BN28204, Bacon Ta 45 made contact with three VC moving to the south at a range of 10 meters. Results: Friendly - negative; Enemy - 3 VC KIA and 1 US Carbine, 1 SKS, 1 bolt action Carbine, one pistol-belt, and chicken grenade, CIA.

(12) On 27 August, vicinity BN067234, COBRA Ta 43 spotted 15 VC coming towards their ambush. Contact was made and machine guns were employed. Continued enemy movement was noted 75 meters to the north and 50 meters to the south. Machine guns were repeatedly employed as well as a flare ship with unknown results. Results: Friendly - negative; Enemy - 3 probable KIA's.

(13) On 28 August, vicinity AN862188, 3-D-3-506 detonated a booby trap resulting in 1 KIA (evacuated). At vicinity AN806181, 3-D-3-506, while on a cloverleaf, found a rice cache containing an estimated 1,500 pounds of rice. At vicinity BN067234, COBRA Ta 43 conducted a sweep of the 27 August contact area. Results: 3 VC KIA, and 3 rucksacks, 4 ponchos, rice, chestnuts, and other clothing CIA. Also found were six expended rounds of AK case, five trails leading to the BV, and some documents with no unit designation. PSB Sandy received 10 82mm mortar rounds with six rounds landing inside the perimeter. Mortar flashes were seen by an FO in the field who called in US artillery on AN803149/803173. Results: Friendly - 1 US KIA (slight); Enemy - unknown.

(14) On 31 August, vicinity AN817161, PSB Sherry took 5-7 82mm mortar rounds outside the perimeter. US artillery was employed. Results: Friendly 1 US KIA (slight); Enemy - unknown.

b. September

(1) On 3 September, vicinity BN078295, 2-D-3-506 found a suspected VC hospital complex containing: 13 bunkers, 11 of which were 6'x6'x8' w/2' of overhead cover, and 2 of which were 10'x10'x8' w/3' of overhead cover. They contained 20 empty bottles of morphine, 20 full bottles of assorted medicines, 1 case; 2 operating tables, one which had fresh blood on it, and 2 benches 6' long. Each of the bunkers had two windows and two entrances with steps leading into them. The remaining bunkers contained surgical cotton, 10 pots, 10 pans, 100 lbs of rice, soap, hair brushes, tooth paste, one chicken grenade, and

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some documents. There were two trails leading into the complex, one from the south and the other from the west. Documents and other items were extracted to LZ Betty.

(2) On 4 September, vicinity 88075300, 3-D-3-506, while moving north, engaged three VC with small arms fire. The enemy fled to the northeast after returning AK-47 fire from a distance of 50 meters. The friendly element pursued the enemy to the northeast for approximately 150 meters and then engaged 10 VC with small arms fire before they also fled to the northeast. Results: Friendly - negative; Enemy - unknown. While conducting a sweep of the area, 3-D-3-506 found a 21-bunker hospital complex. Five bunkers, 10'x12'x6' w/4' overhead cover, contained eight beds constructed of bamboo for a total of 40 beds. Three bunkers were 8'x12'x6' w/4' overhead cover and contained four beds each for a total of 12 beds. Three of the bunkers contained bandages with fresh blood stains. Four bunkers were 10'x10'x6' w/4' overhead cover. Two bunkers contained some wooden chairs. Six bunkers were 6'x8'x1' w/2' overhead cover. Ten spider holes 4' deep and well camouflaged were also found in the area. All bunkers in the complex were destroyed. The following is a list of small items found in the complex: A large quantity of medical supplies, including 25 surgical needles, 2 IV devices (1 bamboo and 1 stainless steel), some syringes, 47 scalpel blades, a large quantity of medicines, including: 500,000 units of penicillin, numerous vitamins and painkillers; 10 AK-47 rounds; 1 chicken pen w/24 chickens; 1 pig pen with 3 pigs; 2 brassieres; 2 garbage pails; 12 25-gallon water jugs; one water jug of unknown size; one 55-gallon drum of water; 1 ammo pouch containing 4 clips of unknown type ammo; four .30-caliber magazines, 1 with ammo; and 25 9mm rounds. In addition there were 14 ponchos, 20 lbs of assorted clothing, 1 hoe and entrenching tool, 1 US steel pot and 1 US canteen, 1 US M-1 carbine, 1 stretcher, 2 baskets w/carrying poles, numerous cooking utensils, including pots, pans, spoon, one tooth brush w/tooth paste, 12 1 1/2 volt batteries, 1 US mess kit, 2 water buckets, 1 wallet, 6 lbs of assorted documents, 6 empty quart bottles, 1 five gallon pan, 1 pair of scissors, 1 can of petroleum and one plastic can of oil. All intel items were extracted to LZ Betty for further evaluation.

(3) On 5 September, LZ Betty received 20-30 82mm rounds inside the perimeter in the vicinity of bunker 19. Results: Negative friendly casualties and one 500-gallon blivet was destroyed while 20 others were damaged. US counter-mortar and artillery fire was employed on the flashes observed at grid AV782059. Results: unknown enemy casualties. At vicinity AV362189, C-3-506 was engaged by an estimated 10-15 VC. The CP and 3-C-3-506 received approximately five B-40 rounds and small arms fire. The company received small arms fire from 300 degrees. Gunships from the 192nd AFG supported the operation. Results: Friendly - 1 US KIA, 1 Kit Cars n Scout KIA, 2 US MIA, 5 VN civilians KIA; Enemy - 1 KIA. FSB Sherry received 5-6 82mm mortar rounds with two hitting inside the perimeter. US counter-mortar artillery fire was called in a suspected enemy locale, vicinity AV809115. Results: Friendly - negative; Enemy - unknown. At vicinity AV862189, CP-C-3-506 received three rounds of 82mm mortar outside the NDP. Counter-mortar fire was employed. Results: Friendly - negative; Enemy - unknown.

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(4) On 6 September, FSB Sherry received 12 82mm mortar rounds, seven of which landed inside the perimeter. The tires on a 2½ ton truck were damaged. US counter-mortar artillery was employed on two suspected enemy locations, vicinity AM798179 and AM802137. Results: Friendly - negative; Enemy - unknown. C-3-506 received five 82mm mortar rounds. All five rounds landed outside of the perimeter with negative damage. Counter-mortar fire (81mm) was employed on a suspected enemy location 2½ kilometers to the west. Results: Friendly - negative; Enemy - unknown. At 1620H, personnel aboard 3-506 C&C ship engaged three VC with M-60 machine-gun fire and CG gas. The VC fled into a tree line to the east. The 3rd platoon of A-3-506 conducted a sweep of the area with negative findings.

(5) On 8 September, personnel on LZ Betty perimeter, bunker 39, reported receiving small arms fire from the ravine to the south-west. Personnel returned small arms fire and personnel on LARC vessel employed M-79 rounds. Contact was broken at 2340H. The LARC vessel returned to pick up one squad which was taken onto the beach to search the ravine area. Another squad searched the ravine area from inside LZ Betty. Both squads reported negative findings.

(6) On 11 September, LZ Betty received 10-15 mortar rounds (unknown type). All rounds hit inside the perimeter. D-2-1 Cav reported a flash at grid AM785057. US artillery and 4.2 inch and 81mm mortars were fired in support. A check at first light revealed that the 14 82mm rounds had impacted 75 meters north of POL dump and traveled in a straight line toward the battalion ammunition storage area coming within 25 meters of the battalion's ASP.

(7) On 12 September, vicinity MM205307, 2-2-3-506 found a bunker complex of 40 bunkers, 5'x5'x5' w/2' overhead cover. There were no signs recent activity. Inside the complex they found: 1 beanie hat; 1 jug of oil (5 lbs); 25 pots; 50 plastic spoons; 40 plates; 1 bed, 9' long; 1 chair; 1 axe; 1 glass fishing float; 2 animal cages; one ID card dated 1962; one doctor's roster, with 17 names (each name had an "H" with check mark) behind the "W-"); 5 lbs of rice; 5 gallons of water; and 2000 shells. All items of intelligence value were extracted to LZ Betty while the remaining items were destroyed. At vicinity AM734930, 1-B-3-506 found two hootches and an unknown number of bunkers, and observed four persons fleeing to the west. Friendlies engaged them with small arms. Results: 3 VC KIA (2 males, 1 female). Also found were papers, clothing, medicine, and food stuffs. Items of intelligence value were extracted to LZ Betty. All others were destroyed. At AM727910, the C&C aircraft 3-506 spotted two VC wearing black PJ's. The four gunners engaged the VC with M-60 machine gun fire. The VC fled into the bushes. Results: 1 VC KIA.

(8) On 13 September, vicinity ZS276928, 1-B-3-506 engaged one VC 100 meters to the north. The VC was wearing green pants and shirt and a green hat. The VC returned fire and fled to the west with unknown results. At vicinity AM017250, 3-C-3-506 received small arms fire from estimated two VC positions. The VC shot 10 rounds of small arms and fled to the southeast. Results: Friendly - negative; Enemy - unknown.

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(9) On 14 September, vicinity BM199306, 3-1-3-506 received five rounds of sniper fire of unknown type from approximately 50 meters to the east. A sweep of the area produced negative findings. At vicinity BM199306, 1-1-3-506 also received three sniper rounds of unknown type 75 meters to the east. Once again a sweep of the area was made with negative results. At vicinity ZS238920, the 3-506 G&S observer sighted and engaged two VC working in a garden plot. One VC was wearing black PJ's, the other only black pants and no shirt. The VC fled to the north. Results: unknown. At vicinity BM273303, Recon Co 41 heard 3-4 rounds of small arms fire approximately 300 meters to the west/northwest. The rounds appeared to be warning shots rather than sniper fire. Naval Gunfire was employed with unknown results.

(10) On 15 September, vicinity BM279311, Recon Co 41 sighted one VC approximately 600 meters to the west wearing black PJ's and carrying an unknown type of weapon. Recon Co 41 employed Naval Gunfire with unknown results. The VC fled to the southeast. At vicinity ZS200306, 1-3-506 received 5-10 rounds of sniper fire from 200 meters to the northwest. Fire was believed to be from extracted three VC using S&S type weapons. Second platoon, 1-3-506 swept the area with negative results. At vicinity LM723928, an OP from 1-8-3-506 received small arms fire from estimated one VC. The OP returned fire with unknown results. One US personnel was KIA and evacuated to LZ Betty. At vicinity BM225304, Recon Co 43 received 7-8 rounds of sniper fire from one VC approximately 75 meters to the south. Naval Gunfire was employed with unknown results. At vicinity BM793443, C(-)-3-506 was alerted to be inserted as a reaction force for Company "C" Ranger Team 23. This team had reported being within 30 feet of 70-100 NVA. Company C(-)-3-506 was inserted and moved north to link with the Rangers. Link-up with the Rangers was accomplished and contact was initiated with the NVA. Gunships from the 192nd AVF and B-2-1 Coy Cobras and LOAs were employed. All troops were extracted 17348, with a total of 59 NVA KIA and negative US casualties. Eight NVA KIA were credited to C(-)-3-506.

(11) On 17 September, vicinity ZS200306, 3-1-3-506 activated an unknown type booby trap resulting in four NVA (evacuated).

(12) On 18 September, vicinity BM195321, 1-3-506 received 15 rounds of sniper fire from estimated two VC, approximately 100 meters to their northwest and northeast. There were negative friendly casualties. This action took place just after their company had been reported. A sweep of the area was conducted with negative findings.

(13) On 20 September, vicinity BM215323, 3-1-3-506 received sniper fire from 200 meters to their northwest. They returned fire with negative results. A sweep of the area revealed six bundles 6'x4'x5' with 2' overhead cover, five 20-gallon water cans (full), four 1 1/2 volt batteries, 1 blanket, 1 knife, 15 packages, 1 bowl of rice, 2 empty bowls, 2 sets of chop sticks, 1 quart can of oil, and 1 M743 grenade launcher adaptor, serial number 7265167. All items were destroyed.

(14) On 21 September, vicinity BM215327, 3-1-3-506 received 6-10

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rounds of sniper fire from estimated one VC, approximately 75 meters to the east, and returned fire with negative results. The VC fled to the west. At vicinity ZS233884, 2-D-3-506 spotted and engaged two VC wearing black PJs 200 meters to the north. The VC fled to the northeast.

(15) On 22 September, vicinity ZS235886, 2-D-3-506 spotted and engaged one VC moving to the northeast, approximately 100 meters northeast. Results: 1 VC KIA wearing black PJs, Ho Chi Minh sandals, no weapon or equipment.

(16) On 23 September, vicinity, AM722900, Recon Troop 41-3-506 was engaged by 4-5 VC, 25-30 meters to their west. Fire was returned with negative results. A sweep of the contact area revealed 1 hootch 12'x12'x6' made of tin, two 5-gallon water containers, 2 baskets, 2 VN ponchos, pots and pans, and a fire that was still burning. All items were destroyed. At vicinity AM730893, Recon Troop 41-3-506 was ambushed by 4-5 VC from 25-30 meters to the southeast and returned fire with negative results. A sweep of the contact area revealed three hootches 6'x10'x6' with tin roofs, and one foxhole 3' in diameter with expanded M-1 brass. All items were destroyed. At vicinity ZT235892, 2-D-3-506 received 6-8 rounds of sniper fire from the south from an unknown size enemy force. They returned fire with negative results. At vicinity MM222341, 3-A-3-506 received five rounds of sniper fire from one VC 100 meters to the east. In a subsequent sweep of the area, four bunkers, and two pig pens were found and destroyed. At 1455H, vicinity AM722899, Recon Troop 41-3-506 was engaged by 4-5 VC at 25-30 meters away on an azimuth of 220 degrees. They returned fire and swept the area with negative findings. At vicinity AM930225, 2-C-3-506 received 7-10 rounds of sniper fire from estimated one VC. Artillery was employed. There were negative friendly casualties.

(17) On 26 September, vicinity AM932219, Whiskey Relay received 5-6 rounds of sniper fire. Artillery was employed with unknown results. At vicinity AM926224, Whiskey Relay received 6-7 rounds of sniper fire from AM932219. Artillery was again employed with unknown results.

(18) On 28 September, vicinity X1339531, A-3-506 spotted one VC in the open, dressed in black PJs, approximately 900 meters to the southeast. Cobra gunships were employed resulting in one VC KIA.

c. Significant Activities: October

(1) On 3 October, vicinity X1362548, D-3-506 found a VC base camp consisting of 15 bunkers 8'x3'x5', w/2' of overhead cover, 1,000 RFD rounds, one Chinese tomahawk, 7 CS canteens, 2 US steel pots, 3 sets of blankets, 10 wooden tables, 2 ovens, 2 blocks of TNT, 5 hootches, 1 axe, 1 US frag grenade, 5 pairs of black PJs, 15 M-16 magazines, 5 knives, 2 US claymore firing devices, 2 field hats, 1 EVA hat, 1 two-hole latrine, and 1 pistol holster. The area had signs of recent habitation. All items of intelligence value were evacuated to LZ Betty for evaluation. All other findings were destroyed.

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(2) On 5 October, F3 Sherry received five rounds of 82mm mortars, all rounds hitting inside the perimeter. F3 artillery was employed in a counter-mortar role with unknown results. There were negative casualties or damage. F3B Sandy received six to eight rounds of 82mm mortars also, all of which hit outside of the perimeter. F3 artillery was employed with unknown results.

(3) On 6 October, vicinity BN363545, 1st Platoon, D-3-506 found a sign carved into a tree stating that 10 VC had been killed by an airstrike approximately six weeks prior. At vicinity BN397543, 3rd platoon, A-3-506 found one pair of NVA pants, one pair of ARVN pants, one black bandanna, one VC hammock, and one NVA gas mask. All items found contained blood stains approximately five months old. All findings were destroyed except the gas mask which was returned to LZ Betty. At vicinity BN274655, 3-B-3-506 found and destroyed one hatch, 40 lbs of rock salt, 30 lbs of rice, 1 canteen, 3 pots, 2 punches, 7 water containers, 3 empty bottles, 1 rice grinder, and 6 tables.

(4) On 9 October, vicinity AM721929, 1-B-3-506 found and destroyed a blue Land Rover missing tires and glass. The license plate was #739572.

(5) On 10 October, vicinity AM722922, 1-B-3-506 found a 55-gallon drum, one third of the way full of water. The drum was destroyed. At ZS 268893, CP-C-3-506 found one hatch, 8'x10'x6' with a tin roof, assorted pots and pans, a five gallon plastic jug of water, one pot of cucumbers, and a grinding mill. All items were destroyed. At BN732699, CP-D-3-506 found eight fresh campfire sites, five well-traveled trails crossing near one cave containing one black VC top, a pile of wood, and one plastic water container. The area has been used the previous day.

(6) On 11 October, vicinity ZS268930, 2-A-3-506 found eight bunkers. Six were 10'x10'x3' and two were 4'x4'x4'. They were estimated last used six months prior. All was destroyed. 1-B-3-506 found two body traps in a small clearing north to south. They were made of metal with trip wire firing devices. Both had been in place an estimated three months and were destroyed. At vicinity ZS269899, 3-C-3-506 found one hatch 8'x6'x6' made of wood with a tin roof. Also found were two chickens, one duck, one pigeon, one corn 1'x3'x2', one uniform cigarette, one jeep headlight, one .30-caliber round, two mortar rounds, one VC Army grenade, freshly picked cucumbers, and two body traps which were not set up. All items were destroyed. At vicinity AM730899, CP-D-3-506 found three sleeping positions estimated to be two days old. 3-D-3-506 found a smoothed out area for husking rice estimated last used two days prior. Also found were two day old tracks of four VC moving to the NW. Also found was a wheat field 100 x 50 meters. The wheat was destroyed. At vicinity AM728898, CP-D-3-506 found a bean garden 25 x 50 meters with stakes with tin foil wrapped around them. Everything was destroyed. At vicinity AM722932, 3-B-3-506 found three garden plots 75 x 50 meters, 75 x 25 meters, and 30 x 30 meters. They contained potatoes, peas, and peanuts. All was destroyed. At vicinity AM731907, 3-B-D-3-506 found one concrete table 3' x 5' and two bunkers 5'x10'x4' w/1/2 of overhead cover. Also found was a hole 10'x8'x3' containing assorted dishes, two karasene lamps, six pair of shower shoes, and one 15-gallon drum of water. All items were destroyed. At vicinity ZS269836, CP-C-3-506, while following a trail of two VC heading north, heard

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chopain to the south. While checking the ground they found one beam plot, 200 x 100 meters, one hootch 10'x3' made of grass, one bunker 4'x8'x3' w/2' of overhead cover, and two garden plots 100x75 meters. Also found was one hootch 10'x10' made of grass. All items were destroyed. At vicinity ZN726898, 2-D-3-506 found one ham made suspension which was evacuated.

(7) On 12 October, vicinity ZS279879, 2-C-3-506 found a network of trails. At the junction they found seven water jars; three clay type, one shall type and three plastic type. Also present were the tracks of two VC moving to their east estimated four hours earlier. Also found were 4 bunkers, 3'x5'x3', 2 with overhead cover and 2 without; also found were 8 plastic water containers; 3 five-gallon tin cans; 4 sets of black PJs; 1 hammock; 20 sets of chop sticks; 40 lbs of fresh fish; 10 lbs of clams; 2 knives; 1 meat cleaver; 1 lb of red papers; 20 assorted pots and pans; 1 log; 1 hoe; 5 low-hearing sticks; 16 chickens; 1 dog, and 1 bird cage. Also found were one US frag grenade and four captive sites approximately three days old. Everything was destroyed. Fifty meters to the north was one field 100 x 100 meters with 12" punji stakes one yard apart around the perimeter. At vicinity ZS279900, 3-B-3-506 found six garden plots, 100x100 meters, containing beans and corn. In the area was a cessing site approximately five days old. One chicken frag grenade, one hoe, one spade, one knife, three sandals, and one bunker 4'x8'x3' w/2' of overhead cover were found and destroyed.

(8) On 13 October, vicinity LN721028, 2-D-3-506 located cultivated fields 150x100 meters. The fields consisted of some kind of wheat and were destroyed. At ZS267897, 2-C-3-506 engaged one VC wearing black PJs and a straw hat approximately 25 meters to their west. The VC fled to the north. At ZS271005, 2-C-3-506 engaged two VC approximately 15 meters to their west. The VC were wearing black PJs and fled to the southeast.

(9) On 14 October, vicinity ZN93154, the CAC helicopter sighted four VC of whom two were on bicycles. US artillery was employed with unknown results. At AH736997, 2-D-3-506 sighted one VC approximately 50 meters to the north and employed M479 rounds with unknown results. At ZN1829, Recon Ta 41 established an estimated four VC and heard more voices to each side. Gunships were employed at 1700H. At approximately 1815H, Ta 41 made contact with an unknown size VC element. At this time a second set of gunships were employed and 18 men of 2-D-3-506 were airlifted from LZ Betty and inserted in support of Recon Ta 41. At 2020H, a co. and Ta 41 linked up forming a BDA.

(10) On 15 October, vicinity ZN182135, Recon Ta 41 engaged four VC 50 meters to the north with small arms fire. The VC fled to the north. Results: Friendly - negative; Enemy - 1 VC KIA (US) CIA who was wearing gray PJ bottoms, a multicolored shirt, and carrying one rucksack filled with assorted contents. POW with rucksack and documents was extracted to LZ Betty for interrogation. At ZN185300, 2-D-3-506 found three fighting positions. One- (one) set of signs of fresh activity were spotted along with fresh cut bamboo. All positions were destroyed. At ZN114200, 2-C-3-506 found one grass hootch 10'x10' and two bamboo animal pens 6'x3'. The facilities were estimated to be six months old. At ZN182288, 3-B-3-506 found 3 rucksacks (VC) containing: 3 benches, 25 lbs of rice, 3 pots, 6 pouches, one quarter-lb stick of TNT, 2 bras, 3 shirts, 2 pair of pants, a repair kit for sandals, 1 pair of sandals,

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1 bottle of ink, 1 canteen cup (US), 1 bottle of hair tonic, 1 canteen (VC), 1 bowl, 1 tube of LSA gun oil, and 1 tooth brush. All items were destroyed. At ZT182200, 3-D-3-506 engaged one VC wearing a poncho 75 meters to the south with small arms fire. He fled to the south. A search of the area turned up one rucksack containing 1 poncho, 1 9mm ammo pouch, 1 flashlight, 1 hammock, 5 lbs of rice, 1 lb of tea, 18 rounds of 9mm ammo, and 1 bottle of US gun oil. At vicinity ZT 182135, Recon Ta 42 engaged five VC with small arms fire. Gunships were on station and were employed. A sweep of the contact area at first light revealed negative results.

(11) On 16 October, vicinity ZT184311, 2-D-3-506 spotted two NVA wearing gray khakis and Ho Chi Minh sandals moving from northeast to southwest approximately 100 meters away. The VC were engaged with small arms fire. Results: Friendly - negative; Enemy - 2 KIA. The following were CIA: two 7.62 pistols; 1 AK-47; one first aid packet; and one leather case with assorted documents. All items were extracted to LZ Betty for proper investigation. At ZT041224, 3-C-3-506 spotted two VC wearing black PJs, one of whom was carrying a M16. The VC were moving east to west and were engaged at a distance of 30 meters. They returned fire and fled to the west. Results: Friendly - one Kit Carson Scout KIA; Enemy - unknown. At ZT233270, 2-D-3-506 found one GMC engine without a carburetor. The engine was estimated to have been in the area about one month and was destroyed in place. At ZT115209, C-3-506 found two hootches on 3' stilts. One hootch was 15'x15'x8' with a tin roof and the other hootch was 8'x20'x8' with a grass roof. Also found were: one 3'x6'x5' chicken coop; 10 .30-caliber rounds; 15 AK-47 rounds in a leather pouch; one 15'x15'x5' pig pen, with one 200-lb pig; and, one 50-lb pig; 10 chickens; 5 US sandbags filled with monkey bones; 25 lbs of seeds; 24 eight-inch long punji stakes; 3 fish traps, 36' long and 8" in diameter; 3 woven baskets; 4 grass trays; 6 one-gallon jugs; 1 two-gallon pot, one 10-gallon clay pot, 1 tea pot, 1 hoe, 1 shovel, 2 knife blades, 1 iron pick, 1 bunker 10'x20' with 3' of overhead cover, and 1 axe head. All hootches, bunkers, and items were destroyed. At ZT233149, Recon Ta 43 spotted 12-15 VC with automatic weapons. Friendlies employed small arms fire, machine, and artillery. The VC fled to the southeast. Results: Friendly - 2 KIA; Enemy - 1 KIA and 2 AK-47's CIA.

(12) On 17 October, vicinity ZT169313, 1-B-3-506 engaged one VC wearing khakis 50 meters away. Results: Friendly - negative; Enemy - 1 KIA. A search of the body turned up two identification cards issued in Binh Tuy Province and two cigarette lighters. A search of the surrounding area turned up three hootches, 4'x6'x6' with grass roofs, and three bunkers 4'x20'x8', w/16" of overhead cover. All bunkers and hootches were destroyed. The identification cards were evacuated to LZ Betty. At ZT169318, 1-B-3-506 received sniper fire from one VC 50 meters to the north. Friendlies returned small arms fire and on searching the area found a blood trail leading to the west. The trail was followed to a hootch 6'x20'x6' with a bunker underneath. The unit then received small arms fire from two VC 200 meters to the west. A search of the hootch turned up assorted documents which were extracted to LZ Betty. The hootch and bunker were destroyed.

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(13) On 13 October, vicinity ZT115223, 2-C-3-506 found 25 hootches 12'x12'x8', 100 lbs of dried corn, 150 lbs of rice, and 1 animal pen 10'x10'x4'. The area was estimated to be five days old. All items were destroyed. At ZT245172, Recon Teams 43 and 45 received automatic weapons fire from 200 meters to the west. US artillery was employed with unknown results. Results: Friendly - negative; Enemy - unknown.

(14) On 19 October, vicinity ZT189312, 3-B-3-506 engaged one VC wearing black pants, gold shirt, Ho Chi Minh sun'als and a beanie hat with small arms at a 25 meter proximity. Results: Friendly - negative; Enemy - one KIA. Also CIA were one AK-47 with 4 full magazines and documents indicating his unit and stating that he was to meet some friends at 1800H. The VC was moving west to east when engaged and was estimated to be 18 years old. At ZT095229, 3-C-3-506 received fire from estimated three VC 50 meters to the west and returned fire employing US artillery with unknown results. At ZT189313, 3-B-3-506 found and destroyed 20 sleeping positions, 10 bunkers 3'x12'x4' w/1/2" of overhead cover, 2 mess tables 14'x4', mortar aiming stake, and 24 empty medicine bottles.

(15) On 20 October, vicinity ZT244442, C(-)-3-506, while conducting a sweep of the previous day's Ranger contact area, found one VC KIA wearing black PJ's. One AK-47 and various documents, including an enemy SOI were CIA. The documents and AK-47 were extracted to LZ Betty. At ZT248283, CP and 1-D-3-506 was extracted and combat assaulted to vicinity ZN738244. The first lift hit the LZ at 1620H and began receiving small arms fire from 200 meters to the east/northeast from an estimated reinforced VC squad. Guns and US artillery were employed and contact with the enemy was subsequently broken. A sweep of the area turned up one fighting position 6'x2'x3' and a trail junction consisting of two smaller trails meeting a main trail which ran in a northeast and southeast direction. At ZT189306, 3-A-3-506 received small arms fire from 6-10 VC 50 meters to the west. Small arms fire and US artillery were employed. Sporadic fire continued until contact was broken. Results: Friendly - 1 KIA; Enemy - unknown.

(16) On 21 October, vicinity ZT139295, Recon Tm 45 received sniper fire from the south. Two enemy wearing gray uniforms with rucksacks were spotted to the west but not engaged. Results: Friendly - negative; Enemy - unknown. At ZT139295, Recon Tm 45 received small arms fire from five VC. Friendlies returned fire and employed artillery. Results: Friendly - negative; Enemy - unknown.

(17) On 22 October, vicinity ZT249277, 3-D-3-506 received fire from an estimated two VC 50 meters to the west. Fire was returned and a sweep of the area turned up 3 hootches 10'x12'x8', 2 bunkers (6'x4'x3' with 2" of overhead cover), 15 lbs of rice, and a trail running northeast and southwest. All items were destroyed. At ZT248172, Recon Tm 43 spotted three VC wearing light colored clothes, two of which were carrying weapons. The VC were 400 meters to the north moving east to west and were not engaged because of the distance. A sweep of this area turned up 15 bunkers; 10 of which measured 3'x7'x3' w/2" of overhead cover; 5 unfinished bunkers; and a grinding tool for corn or rice. The area was dotted with campfire sites and estimated to be six months old and was used within the last two weeks. All bunkers were destroyed.

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(18) On 23 October, vicinity ZT138321, TF 3-506 employed three air strikes in preparation for a combat assault conducted by D-3-506. Friendly artillery was employed in the same vicinity and resulted in two secondary explosions. At vicinity ZT139307, CP-D-3-506 found five bunkers, one was 4'x6'x8' and other four ranged in size from 4'x6'x4' w/3' of overhead cover to 3'x4'x4' w/3' of overhead cover; one trench, 60 meters long and five feet deep; various earthen hills, carved out as fighting positions; one "Y" shaped bunker; one "U" shaped bunker; and, two "Y" shaped bunkers. At the end of each "Y" was a trap door and in the center of the area was an anthill 4'x4' hollowed out as a fighting position with one exit. There was an old kitchen outside the trench area 10'x6'x6' that was almost completely demolished by artillery fire. In the kitchen was found one stove, seven crushed pots and pans, and another anthill shaped as a fighting position. The sides of the kitchen were made of bamboo and next to the kitchen was found one bunker 3'x8'x4' with 3' of overhead cover. There were also two bamboo water containers, one storage hole 2'x2'x3' covered with bamboo, one barracks area approximately the same size as the kitchen, and one garden plot 10'x15' containing cucumbers. The area was last used within the past week. All items not severely damaged or destroyed by artillery fire were destroyed.

(19) On 24 October, vicinity ZT150137, 2-C-3-506, while approaching a garden, received small arms fire from one VC, 30 to 40 meters away and returned fire. The VC fled to the west and was pursued with negative results. At ZT143149, CP-C-3-506 found 13 bunkers 10'x3'x4' w/3' of overhead cover. Each bunker had a living area consisting of a hammock rack and two animal cages 3'x3'x3'. The area was last used approximately two months ago. All bunkers and items were destroyed. At ZT137304, 3-D-3-506 ambushed three VC with M-79 and small arms fire. The VC fled north/northeast. Friendlies followed 11 of trails and then employed a tracker team. The tracker team moved 700 meters north/northeast and found one dead VC partially buried wearing black PJ's; and, moving 250 meters further, in the same direction, found another dead VC. Neither VC had weapons. Results: Friendly - negative; Enemy - 2 KIA.

(20) On 25 October, vicinity ZT140308, 2-D-3-506 spotted two VC within 100 meters away moving southwest, wearing black PJ's and carrying AK-47's. Friendlies engaged with small arms fire and the VC fled to the north. At ZT221177, Recon Troop 43 spotted 20 heavily armed VC wearing black PJ's and camouflaged fatigues. The VC were 140 meters to the north and were moving east carrying small arms and a tube shaped object that was wrapped up. Artillery and gunships from 2-1 CAV were employed with unknown results. At ZT221177, 2-C-3-506 was combat assaulted to sweep the area which had been saturated by artillery and gunships after Recon Troop 43's sighting of 20 VC. The area was searched with negative results.

(21) On 25 October, vicinity ZT214191, 2-C-3-506 found one bunker 4'x6'x4' w/19" of overhead cover and two "L" shaped trenches 1 1/2'x2 1/2'x5'. Both the bunker and the trenches were very old and had one day old tracks of four VC moving east. A tracker team was employed with negative results. The bunker and trenches were destroyed. At ZT142142, CP-C-3-506 received small arms fire from three VC armed with AK-47's 100 meters to the southeast. Fire was returned and a sweep of the area produced negative results. There were negative friendly casualties.

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(22) On 27 October, 12 men from the 3-506 Recon platoon were airlifted to Song Mao and began pair-off operations with the 44th ARVN Regiment.

(23) On 28 October, vicinity ZT125323, 2-D-3-506 engaged 1 VC wearing a light purple shirt and carrying a small arms weapon. While pursuing the VC, 2-D-3-506 was engaged by an estimated 5 or 6 VC. The contact resulted in 1 Friendly KIA and 2 WIA; Enemy - unknown. C-3-506 was airlifted to Song Mao where they began combined operations with the 44th ARVN Regiment.

(24) On 30 October, FSB Zowert was closed and FSB Curdshee was established in a new AO, vicinity ZT206448. At 1015H, 1-C-3-506, at vicinity BN222633 engaged 1 VC wearing a blue shirt and gray pants and carrying a small arms weapon. Results were: 1 VC KIA and 1 carbine CIA.

(25) On 31 October, vicinity ZT2245, 3-A-3-506 engaged 1 VC in a garden plot 150 meters away. The VC had no weapon and was only wearing a loin cloth. Results: 1 VC KIA.

3. Intelligence Summary:

a. Enemy Disposition: During the reporting period, as a result of friendly operations, MR6 shifted its elements to the SW to the vicinity of ZT2045 (center of mass). The main force units continue to avoid contact, but are reported to be operating in northern Binh Thuan Province, north of Song Mao. The local force units areas of operations have changed little during the quarter. Suspected enemy dispositions at the end of the reporting period are as follows:

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>STRENGTH</u> |
|-------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| MR 6 HQ | ZT 2045 | 400 |
| 240 NVA Bn | BN 2750 | 250 |
| 340 NP Bn | BN 3643 | 400 |
| 136 N3 Bn | BN 1650 | 250 |
| 432 LF Bn | AN 7220 | 150 |
| C1/431 Bn | ZS 2499 | 30 |
| C2/431 Bn | ZT 2417 | 30 |
| C3/431 Bn | AN 9314 | 30 |
| 09 LF Co | BN 3547 | 50 |
| 430 LF Co | AN 7317 | 35 |
| 440 LF Co | BN 2435 | 45 |

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| | | |
|-----------|---------|----|
| 450 LF Co | BN 0219 | 30 |
| 490 LF Co | BN 4050 | 60 |

4. Enemy Activities:

a. During the reporting period contact with enemy forces has been generally light with units of platoon size or less. Contacts with Main Force units have only been made as the result of US reconnaissance in force operations. Enemy initiated contacts have been left to local force units and Arrow action teams. Large numbers of enemy forces associated with MR6 and the Binh Thuan Province Committee are operating near the Lam Dong-Binh Tuy border and tend to avoid contact whenever possible. Emphasis by the enemy continues to be on the disruption of the GVN pacification program through terrorist activities. Infiltration of villages for the purpose of abducting civilians, assassinating GVN officials, extorting money and supplies and impressing civilians into the VC labor force is widespread throughout the province. Main roads, particularly QL1 and 89, have been heavily interdicted by the VC with mines and booby traps.

b. Enemy forces, particularly those along the Binh Tuy - Lam Dong borders, have extensive areas under cultivation. It has been a secondary mission of friendly operations to find and destroy these areas. US operations against these areas have had an adverse effect on the ability of the VC to continue to launch offensives in Binh Thuan Province. Local force units continue to be resupplied from the populated areas.

c. During the month of August one enemy unit was identified. Elements of the 840 MF Bn were identified in a contact with a Ranger team (vic BN 3254) on the first of August. A large quantity of fresh rice found in the contact area indicates that the enemy in this area is being resupplied with food from its rice paddies north of Song Mao.

(1) During the month there was an increase in enemy activity with 148 incidents reported. Of these, 83 were start-off border attacks and 25 were attacks directed against civilians. The high point of the month occurred on 11-12 August as 17 contacts were reported on that night. On 20 August, 19 kilometers northeast of Thuan Thiet, a civilian bus with 37 passengers hit a mine resulting in 10 civilians killed and 22 wounded. The majority of contacts between friendly and enemy forces took place in the Thien Mao District "Triangle Area" and Le Hon Thung Forest. The enemy continued to find F-3D Sherry and Sandy attractive targets as they received mortar attacks on several occasions.

(2) Effect of US operations and evaluation:

(a) TF 3-506 conducted operations against enemy base areas on the periphery of the populated areas. Contact during the month was light, however, continued emphasis has been placed on destroying bunkers and cultivated areas.

(b) Small unit operations against enemy base areas continued to be effective and well suited to combat small VC units. The VC continue to operate

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in equal-size elements.

(c) During the month of August reconnaissance platoon elements of TF 3-506 accounted for 80% of the battalion's body count. This has been primarily due to the fact that they operate in small units. A majority of the reconnaissance platoon's enemy body count was obtained while ambushing water holes in the Le Hong Phung forest. This held true only in the beginning of August due to the lack of rain. As the monsoons increased in intensity and water became more plentiful, ambushes at water holes were no longer successful.

(3) Enemy Capabilities and Vulnerabilities:

(a) The enemy has the capability to conduct attacks by fire, employing 82mm mortar and 107mm rockets, and strike village defenses and allied installations in up to multi-battalion strength.

(b) Enemy supply areas are generally insecure, making them vulnerable to friendly VFP operations.

(c) Low morale exists in many units because of food shortages, sickness and continual US and RVN harassment. The enemy is susceptible to friendly psychological operations.

d. During the month of September one enemy unit was identified. On 30 August, the 487th RF Co ambushed elements of the 482B at 2T279089. One POW was captured and identified himself as a member of 02/482B. During the month of September there was a decrease in enemy activity with 36 incidents reported (32 enemy initiated, 19 friendly initiated, 11 standoff attacks, 10 incidents involving mines or booby traps and 6 involving snipers). At 160936H, via 2T205930, elements of 2-1 GAV and the 234 RF Co, while searching 0L-1, were ambushed by an estimated enemy platoon. Contact was broken at 0950H resulting in 2 US KIA, 2 MIA, 3 RF KIA and 3 RF MIA. Enemy casualties were unknown. At 192000K, via 129 5120, 7 members of a VC AIF entered Thien Long (H) and kidnaped the 16-year-old boy and extracted 6,400\$VN and 20 kilos of rice. At 111312X, via 12935142, an APC from 2-4-1-50 hit a 105 booby trap round resulting in 2 US KIA and 5 US MIA.

(1) TF 3-506 conducted operations against VC/NVA units in the Le Hong Phung and in the mountains north of Bay Lien. Contact during the month of September was light; however, continued emphasis was placed on destroying bunkers and cultivated areas. On 4 September, D-3-506 engaged 10 VC. At 03062297, while on a sweep of the contact area, a large bunker complex was uncovered along with numerous medical supplies, surgical equipment and documents. Many of the bunkers contained bamboo beds totaling 52 beds. Roadcut from the documents captured identified this complex as the Thuan Thung (GVN name Le Hong Phung) Dispensary. From the documents it is clear this hospital served units throughout Binh Thuan Province. Also from material captured it appeared that the VC had used this area as a medical training center and a political indoctrination site.

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(2) During September US Forces experienced difficulty finding VC/NVA elements. It appeared the VC/NVA MF units were avoiding contact and relying on LF guerrillas to harass and terrorize hamlets and villages. In Binh Thuan Province, Nam Thuan District appears to be a prime target for VC forces to conduct small unit operations designed to disrupt the GVN pacification efforts.

a. During the month of October it is believed that NVA remained in the vicinity of ZT2045. The 1st NVA Co is still being reported north of the Le Hung Thong forest in the vicinity of 881650. HAI Thanh Bui Van Nam, who rallied to the GVN on 18 October 1969, stated that the entire 340 Bn is supposed to have from its present AO in Northern Binh Thuan (P) to a new AO in Southern Binh Thuan Province on 30 October 1969. According to Nam, a 30-man advanced party has already arrived in the AO which extends from 889012 to 889513 to 889721 and westward to the triangle area. Local force companies are still being used to support village guerrilla units and Arrow Section Teams continue to harass the local population by means of extortion, kidnaping, propagandizing and terroristic activities.

(1) Enemy Activity: During the month two enemy units were identified. On 16 October Recon 43-3-506 engaged an estimated 20 VC. Documents taken from an enemy body identified the 400 Province unit. On 7 October the Scouts-1-50 ambushed 9 NVA. Two were killed and one was captured. The POW was identified as an NVA platoon leader from the 450 LF Company.

(a) During the month there was an increase in enemy activity with approximately 91 incidents reported (the increase is due primarily to increased US efforts to find VC/NVA units). Of these, 22 were stand-off mortar attacks, 14 were mining and booby trap incidents, 6 were directed terrorist actions against civilians, and 23 were sniping incidents. On 9 October an estimated enemy squad, employing 2-40 rockets, automatic weapons, bangalore torpedoes and attached charges, overran a security outpost at Phu Sung, vic ZT235062. The contact resulted in 4 RF KIA, 11 RF WIA, 14 RF MIA, and 11 M-16, 6 M-79, 3 45-caliber pistols, 3 VC/25 radios, and 1 81mm mortar tube CIA. On October 15, vic ZTL82135, Recon 41 ambushed an estimated 4 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA/POW. The POW was identified as a Commo-Intison officer for the 401 Bn. On 16 October, vic ZTL84301, 2nd platoon, 4-3-506 engaged an estimated 2 NVA. Both were killed and an AK-47, two 7.62mm pistols, and assorted documents were captured. These documents identified a VC platoon leaders school. A 3rd Chenh, Hugh Van Song, who rallied on 21 September 1969 shortly after he had completed the school, agreed to lead US forces into the area. Song was inserted in the area with a recon squad. As they approached the school location, they were engaged by the enemy and extracted. On 20 October, D-3-506 was inserted in the area, vic 738281, and found the suspected school/training area. No contact was made with enemy forces. Also on 18 October, vic ZT233139, Recon Tm 43 engaged an estimated 20 VC, resulting in 1 VC KIA and 2 AK-47's and assorted documents CIA. On 20 October, vic 88738281, while being inserted into an LZ, D-3-506 received fire from a VC squad. The contact continued for approximately one hour.

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5. Collation: It is apparent that the VC/NVA forces have resorted to guerrilla tactics as opposed to large military operations. Large units are expected to continue to avoid contact in the immediate future, but will instead place emphasis on reorganization and establishing food caches through the local force units during the current Rice Harvest season. It is anticipated that low-level guerrilla activities will predominate within the outcome of political events.

6. SECTION 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders Observation, Evaluation, and Recommendations

a. Personnel: None

b. Intelligence: None

c. Operations:

(1) (a) Observation: Foot source denial to local and main force VC units is an excellent way to apply pressure to the enemy particularly at a time when he is avoiding contact.

(b) Evaluation: During the reporting period, TF 3-506 continued to operate in company and platoon size strength in proximity to cultivated areas centered in the Le Hong Pheng forest and Southern Free Strike Area. These cultivated areas were extensive in terms of number and total acreage and contained vast quantities of staple food crops essential to Viet Cong existence. Defoliation requests were submitted; however, experience subsequently proved the process for obtaining approval to defoliate and then getting the missions flown by USAF Ranch Hand aircraft to be excessive, i.e. in each instance, the target crop matured and was ready for harvest prior to defoliation. Numerous elements of this battalion destroyed crops by hand, using machetes and entrenching tools, insofar as practical. Many fields were later found to have plant materials which had not been completely destroyed. This experience clearly demonstrated the need for chemical defoliation which would preclude further use of plant materials. To be effective, chemical defoliation application should be made well into the growing season and yet early enough to clearly prevent crop maturity (e.g. it does little good to kill the vines when the stalks or fruit is already matured).

(c) Recommendations: Defoliation requests should be made annually in early February to permit time for approval and mission scheduling so that actual defoliation takes place in late June. Use of this technique will force VC units to rely on the local population for rations and will thus make them more vulnerable to ambush and interdiction.

(2) (a) Observation: Amphibious assaults provide an excellent means of inserting troops into the AO and tend to deceive the enemy who is accustomed to extensive VC helicopter operations.

(b) Evaluation: On 10 October 1969, this Task Force employed an Army Landing Craft Utility to conduct a beachhead assault using an infantry company. The assault required the participation and cooperation of the per-

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personnel of: Logistical Support Activity, Phan Thiet; Transportation Management Agency, CMR; USN Destroyer USS O'Brien; and, a local USCG Patrol Boat. Embarkation at LZ Betty port facilities was accomplished by shuttling the infantrymen and their equipment to an offshore LCU mooring by LCPC. Actual loading was completed in 1 hour and 15 minutes. The LCU covered the 15 Km south to an offshore rendezvous point in approximately 2 1/2 hours. The actual landing was preceded by naval gunfire bombardment and the LCU was escorted to the beach by a Coast Guard Patrol boat which placed suppressive fires on the beach using direct fire 81mm mortar and .50 caliber machine-guns. Disembarkation was completed in 10 minutes without incident. The operation proved highly successful from a coordination/control stand point. The ease with which the operation was performed was the direct result of the ready cooperation of LSA, transportation, coast guard, and navy personnel.

(c) Recommendation: Amphibious assaults should be used as an occasional change of pace by all units operating in coastal areas.

(3) (a) Observation: Some Flow operations that open jungle areas can pay increased dividends in the form of landing zones and permit the employment of mechanized/armored units in areas previously only accessible to airmobile infantry.

(b) Evaluation: During the reported period, some Flows of the 607th Land Clearing Company were used to cut 40 meter wide swaths through the Le Hong Phong forest. These swaths were designed to bisect or intersect and provided readily available LZ's at almost any point in the Le Hong Phong forest. In addition, they permit excellent aerial surveillance there by channelizing enemy movements while at the same time affording open routes for cavalry and mechanized units to penetrate the forest. One of the dividends afforded by the numerous some Flow swaths is that mechanized/armored vehicles now have access to many VC food production areas. By intentional over-running of the enemy, the tracked vehicles do an excellent job of destroying stocks with a minimum amount of effort.

(c) Recommendation: Some Flow operations should be used to open routes through jungled areas with relatively favorable trafficability characteristics (disregarding vegetation). This employment of some Flows is particularly well-suited to coastal areas.

d. Organization: None

e. Training: None

f. Logistics: None

g. Communications: None

h. Material: None

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i. Other: None

for Maj John V. Halloran
James H. Bowers
LTC, Infantry
Commanding

1 Incl: Task Force Organization Chart

Distribution:

- 3 - CG, I Field Force V
- 3 - CG, USARV, AFHQ: AFHQ - DST
- 2 - CINCPACAF, AFHQ: GPOF - DT, APO 96550
- 5 - Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division, AFHQ: G3

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SUBJECT: Task Force Organization

1. The Task Organization of Task Force 3-5th Infantry at the beginning of the reporting period was as shown below:

- a. A-3-506th Infantry
- b. B-3-506th Infantry
- c. C-3-506th Infantry
- d. D-3-506th Infantry
- e. E-3-506th Infantry
 - (1) Recon Platoon
 - (2) 4.2" Mortar Platoon
 - (3) 81mm Mortar Platoon
- f. 1 Platoon, 320th Engineers (attached)
- g. D-2-320th Artillery (26)